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LOCAL LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW* 
TIMOTHY MEYER** 
On February 4, 2016, the United States and eleven other 
countries signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)—the 
most far-reaching free trade agreement since the World Trade 
Organization’s founding in 1995. Unlike most prior trade 
agreements, the TPP’s purported benefits do not come primarily 
from reductions in tariffs paid on goods at the border. Instead, 
they flow from assumptions that so-called non-tariff barriers—
such as discrimination against foreign investors or service 
providers—will fall significantly under the TPP. 
Yet to date, unnoticed among the TPP’s thirty chapters, 
schedules, and annexes, are provisions that exempt state, 
provincial, and local measures from compliance with many of 
the agreement’s nondiscrimination rules. Under the TPP, 
subnational governments such as California or Ontario—
governments with substantial regulatory authority over regional 
economies much larger than many national economies—may 
continue to discriminate against foreign investors or foreign 
service providers indefinitely. These exemptions represent the 
multilateralization of a trend underway for a number of years in 
U.S. treaty practice: efforts to reduce the federal government’s 
liability for subnational action that the federal government often 
cannot control and of which it is frequently unaware. Indeed, 
forty-one percent of the claims brought under the investor-state 
dispute settlement (“ISDS”) provisions of the 1994 North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) have challenged 
subnational government action. These exemptions also reflect a 
growing pushback against ISDS in countries such as Australia, 
France, Germany, and the United States. 
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Contrary to U.S. treaty practice and ISDS’s critics, this Article 
argues that foreign investors or aggrieved trading partners should 
be able to make their claims directly against subnational 
governments, such as California, rather than only against 
national governments, like the United States. The case is made by 
presenting and analyzing international liability rules for local 
action. Governments use three kinds of local liability rules: (1) 
immunity, under which neither the subnational nor national 
governments are answerable under international law for the 
actions of a subnational government; (2) vicarious liability, 
under which nations are liable for the actions of their subnational 
units even if they do not control them as a matter of domestic 
law; and (3) direct liability, under which a claimant’s case is 
brought directly against the offending subnational government. 
Vicarious liability is the default rule under the international law 
of state responsibility. However, immunity—the rule under an 
increasing number of economic treaties, including the TPP’s 
investment and services chapters—is on the rise. Direct liability is 
rare, but exists in certain investment agreements and applies to 
the European Union. 
The choice among these liability rules is the most important front 
in efforts to reconcile a robust federalism with the increasing 
importance of local governments to international affairs—an 
ongoing battle in the United States, the European Union, and 
other federal nations. Direct liability best achieves the twin goals 
of fostering local governance and international cooperation for 
three reasons. First, direct liability would force subnational 
governments to internalize the costs of their actions, thereby 
deterring violations. Under vicarious liability, the costs of 
violations are borne by the national government, and under 
immunity, they are borne by the claimant who is left with no 
recourse. Second, a move to direct liability would have beneficial 
distributional consequences, ensuring that powerful federal 
nations do not force liberalization in developing countries while 
protecting discriminatory practices within their own countries. 
Third, a move to direct liability would recognize the considerably 
more important role subnational governments play in 
international affairs today. From climate change and renewable 
energy to international trade, subnational governments are 
incredibly active in tackling matters of international concern. 
They should also bear responsibility for their actions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 4, 2016, the United States and eleven other 
countries signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”).1 Touted by 
 
 1. Trans Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Signed in Auckland, BBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35480600 [http://perma.cc/FL22-B3XW]. As this 
Article goes to press, the TPP’s future has become uncertain in light of U.S. President-
elect Donald Trump’s pledge not to go forward with the agreement. Nicky Woolf, Justin 
McCurry & Benjamin Haas, Trump to Withdraw from Trans-Pacific Partnership on First 
Day in Office, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2016, 5:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/nov/21/donald-trump-100-days-plans-video-trans-pacific-partnership-withdraw 
[https://perma.cc/8CDD-ZPU8]. The analysis in this Article of liability rules for 
subnational governments does not depend, however, on whether the United States 
95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017) 
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President Obama as “writ[ing] the rules of global trade for the 21st 
century[,]” the twelve TPP signatories account for forty percent of 
global GDP and one-third of global trade.2 These figures stand to 
grow, both as the size of Asian economies increase and as potential 
new members, such as South Korea3 and China,4 join the agreement. 
In short, its proponents view the TPP as the “state of the art for 
international trade agreements,” creating a powerful precedent for 
future economic integration.5 Economists disagree about the TPP’s 
effects. While some argue that the TPP will lead to higher 
unemployment and inequality,6 most agree that the agreement will 
lead to significant income growth across member states.7 Unlike most 
prior trade agreements,8 however, the TPP’s purported benefits do 
not come primarily from reductions in tariffs paid on goods at the 
border; instead, they flow from assumptions that so-called non-tariff 
barriers—such as discrimination against foreign investors or service 
providers—will fall significantly under the TPP.9 
 
ultimately joins the TPP. As discussed infra, the TPP’s local liability rules are similar to 
those found in many other international economic law agreements. 
 2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama in Meeting on the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11
/18/remarks-president-obama-meeting-trans-pacific-partnership [http://perma.cc/2H74-HNTJ]. 
 3. Kwanwoo Jun, South Korea Reiterates Interest in Trans-Pacific Partnership, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-reiterates-
interest-in-trans-pacific-partnership-1444057143. 
 4. Sarah Hsu, China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 14, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-and-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ [http://perma.cc/6M6G-
2KCE] (“China has long stated that it is willing to consider joining the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership	.	.	.	.”). 
 5. ADVISORY COMM. FOR TRADE POLICY & NEGOTIATIONS, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ON 
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) 5 (2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files
/Advisory-Committee-on-Trade-Policy-and-Negotiations.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UE8-BF9W]. 
 6. See Jeronim Capaldo & Alex Izurieta, Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality 
and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 1 (Glob. Dev. & Env’t Inst., 
Working Paper No. 16-01, 2016), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/16-01Capaldo-
IzurietaTPP.pdf [http://perma.cc/44DN-MZES]. 
 7. See, e.g., Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates 1–3 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working 
Paper No. 16-2, 2016), http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp16-2.pdf [https://perma.cc
/DFT6-WWZP]. 
 8. See, e.g., Summary of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 2004), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-
sheets/archives/2004/february/summary-us-australia-free-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc
/2FJK-ZWFE] (noting that the Australia-U.S. FTA provided “immediate benefits for 
America’s manufacturing workers” pursuant to significant tariff reductions). 
 9. Dani Rodrik, The Trade Numbers Game, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/tpp-debate-economic-benefits-by-dani-rodrik-
2016-02 [http://perma.cc/ACG7-NNRB]. 
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This Article argues that the TPP is unlikely to reduce 
discrimination significantly in many major TPP signatory nations. 
Unnoticed among the thirty chapters, schedules, and annexes are 
provisions that exempt existing state, provincial, and local measures 
from the nondiscrimination rules contained in the investment and 
services chapters.10 Local, state, and provincial governments can 
therefore continue to discriminate against foreign investors and 
service providers indefinitely. To give but one example, international 
tribunals have held that state and local laws that permit services such 
as gambling and betting to be provided in person but not online 
discriminate unlawfully against foreign service providers.11 Under the 
TPP, these laws would be immune from challenge.12 
These exemptions represent the multilateralization of a trend 
underway for a number of years in U.S. treaty practice: efforts to 
immunize the federal government against liability for subnational 
government action that it often cannot control and of which it is 
frequently unaware. Indeed, forty-one percent of the claims brought 
under the investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) provisions of 
the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) have 
challenged subnational government action.13 These exemptions also 
reflect a growing pushback against ISDS, a push led by Senator 
Elizabeth Warren14 in the United States and supported by nations 
 
 10. Trans-Pacific Partnership arts. 9.12, 10.7, opened for signature Feb. 4, 2016 
[hereinafter TPP] (providing that the nondiscrimination rules contained in chapter 9 on 
investment and chapter 10 on trade in services “shall not apply to: any existing non-
conforming measure	.	.	.	[at] a regional level of government, as set out by that Party in its 
Schedule to Annex I, or a local level of government[,]” as well as the continuation, 
renewal, or amendment of such measures). The four federal TPP signatories—Australia, 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States—included reservations in their schedules that 
exempted all non-conforming measures at the state or provincial levels of government. See 
id. Annexes I & II. For the full text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, see TPP Full Text, 
OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements
/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/723C-AZ6E]. 
 11. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶	5, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 
7, 2005) (finding that U.S. and local laws prohibiting internet gambling while permitting 
in-person gambling violate the General Agreement on Trade in Services). 
 12. See infra Section I.B. 
 13. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 14. Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone 
Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-
bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [http://perma.cc/4BSD-36JR]. 
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such as Australia,15 France, and Germany.16 These critics call for an 
end to the system that allows private citizens to sue governments for 
violations of rights conferred by economic treaties.17 While these 
exemptions do not end ISDS, they are part of an increasingly large 
hole in the scope of governmental action subject to review by 
tribunals.18 Along with sector-specific carve-outs for politically 
noxious industries such as tobacco,19 exemptions for subnational 
discrimination could presage ISDS’s death by a thousand cuts. 
Contrary to U.S. treaty practice, this Article argues that foreign 
investors or aggrieved trading partners should be able to bring claims 
directly against subnational governments such as California, rather 
than only against national governments like the United States. The 
choice among liability rules for subnational action is the most 
important front in efforts to reconcile a robust federalism with the 
increasing importance of subnational governments to international 
affairs—an ongoing battle in the United States, the European Union 
(“EU”), and other federal nations. The trend towards immunity 
means that increasingly large swaths of regulatory activity remain 
outside international economic law’s disciplines. Insulating 
subnational measures from international review may also encourage 
nations with malleable federal structures—where regulatory authority 
can be reallocated from the center to local governments and vice 
versa—to push discriminatory activity down to the local level. (This 
Article shall use the terms “subnational” and “local” 
 
 15. See Tom Iggulden, Trans-Pacific Partnership Opposition Blamed on Dispute 
Clauses, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-01/transpacific-
partnership-why-so-much-opposition/6363326 [https://perma.cc/TP6A-FV85]. 
 16. Cecile Barbiere, France and Germany to Form United Front Against ISDS, 
EURACTIV (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/france-and-
germany-form-united-front-against-isds-311267 [http://perma.cc/V4TZ-UNFS]. 
 17. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14 (arguing that ISDS may make sense “in an 
arbitration between two corporations, but not in cases between corporations and 
governments”). 
 18. These exemptions originated in bilateral investment agreements, largely in 
response to the different incentives created by investor-state dispute settlement. See infra 
Section III.B. Today, though, these exemptions appear both in the investment and trade 
services chapters of agreements such as the TPP. See TPP, supra note 10, art. 11.10. I 
therefore discuss both trade and investment throughout the Article, although I do 
differentiate between the two. Investment disputes are between private parties and states 
and lead to monetary awards, while trade disputes are between states only and lead to the 
reciprocal withdrawal of concessions. See infra notes 187–90 and accompanying text. 
These differences in dispute resolution have important implications for states’ willingness 
to use immunity. See infra Part III. 
 19. TPP, supra note 10, art. 29.5 (“A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B 
of Chapter 9 (Investment) with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure.”). 
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interchangeably.20) It also has distributional implications, as federal 
nations are more likely to get away with significant discrimination 
than are unitary states. California’s economy, to take the most 
significant example, would be the sixth largest national economy in 
the world.21 Under the TPP, California is free to continue its existing 
discriminatory practices while smaller economies such as Vietnam or 
New Zealand must cease. Direct liability, on the other hand, better 
achieves the twin goals of fostering local governance and 
international cooperation. 
To make the case, I present the first study of international 
liability rules for local action. I find that countries use three different 
local liability rules: strict vicarious liability, immunity, and direct 
liability. Strict vicarious liability is the default rule that applies under 
international law.22 A national government is liable for the actions of 
its subnational units, even when it does not control those actions. 
Thus, for example, when the province of Ontario provides 
discriminatory renewable energy subsidies, Canada, and not Ontario, 
is the party held accountable before the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) and a NAFTA investment tribunal.23 Similarly, when the 
State of Washington provides subsidies to Boeing that violate the 
WTO’s rules, the United States—not Washington—is held 
responsible through the WTO dispute settlement system.24 
 
 20. One can think of four levels of governmental action: international, national, 
regional (i.e., state or provincial), and local (e.g., city, county, town). These terms quickly 
become confusing. For example, in international law, nations are referred to as “states,” 
while federal countries such the United States, Mexico, and Australia refer to their 
regional governments as “states.” Three levels of governance—international, national, and 
subnational—are, for the most part, sufficient for my purposes. I shall therefore use both 
the terms “subnational” and “local” to refer collectively to regional and local 
governments. I shall use the term “state” to refer to nations except where the context 
makes clear that I am referring to, e.g., U.S. states. Where I refer to them specifically, I 
shall call city, county, and town governments “truly local.” 
 21. Robin Respant, California Passes France as World’s 6th-Largest Economy, 
REUTERS, (June 17, 2016, 9:17 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-
economy-idUSKCN0Z32K2 [https://perma.cc/4YBF-MVJD]. 
 22. See infra Part I. 
 23. Appellate Body Reports, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, 
¶	5.85, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 24, 2013) 
[hereinafter Canada—Renewable Energy] (finding that Canada’s local content 
requirement (“LCR”) programs—“Minimum Required Domestic Content Levels”—
violate article III, section 4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
standards). 
 24. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft—(Second Complaint), ¶	1350, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted Mar. 23, 
2012) [hereinafter U.S.—Aircraft] (holding that subsidies granted to Boeing by the State of 
95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017) 
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Immunity, under which neither the national nor local 
government can be held responsible for otherwise unlawful 
discriminatory acts, has appeared with increasing frequency in 
economic treaties in the last fifteen years.25 In U.S. treaty practice, 
crafting exemptions for U.S. states, either through substantive law or 
through reservations, has a long and sometimes contentious history.26 
Immunity is a recent innovation in economic agreements, however. 
As late as 1994, when nations negotiated the WTO agreements, they 
expressed particular concern about the ability of local governments to 
stymy efforts to liberalize international trade. The WTO’s Technical 
Barriers to Trade Agreement (“TBT Agreement”), for example, 
confirms not only that members are responsible for the actions of 
their local governments;27 it also provides that “[m]embers shall 
formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in 
support of the observance of the provisions of Article 2 by other than 
central government bodies.”28 The TBT Agreement thus provides an 
independent duty to supervise local governments that goes beyond 
mere responsibility for their actions. Today, however, a blanket 
exemption for existing non-conforming local measures is standard in 
 
Washington and the City of Wichita, Kansas, violated the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures). 
 25. Immunity is the rule that applies as a matter of domestic law in the United States 
between the federal and state governments. A plaintiff may not sue the federal 
government for actions of state governments, nor, as a result of Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity, may a plaintiff sue the state (i.e., regional) government directly in 
federal court unless the state has consented. U.S. CONST. amend XI; see also, e.g., 
Blatchford v. Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the 
Eleventh Amendment to stand	.	.	.	for the presupposition of our constitutional structure 
which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; 
that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a State will 
therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to suit, either 
expressly or in the ‘plan of the convention.’	”).  
 26. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and 
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 409 (2000) (discussing how, historically, the 
United States has limited the application of international agreements to the states). A 
recent example comes from the United States’ reservation to the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption, where “[t]he United States of America reserve[d] the 
right to assume obligations under the Convention in a manner consistent with its 
fundamental principles of federalism.” S. REP. NO. 109-4, §	2(1), at 6–7 (2005). 
 27. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 3.5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 
[hereinafter TBT Agreement] (providing with respect to local governments that 
“[m]embers are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all 
provisions of Article 2[,]” which provides the main substantive rules of the TBT 
Agreement). 
 28. Id. 
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multilateral trade and investment agreements, such as the TPP, as 
well as federal nations’ bilateral investment treaties (“BIT”).29 
Direct liability, under which claimants can bring claims directly 
against an offending local government, is the least common of the 
three rules. The International Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“ICSID Convention”) provides a mechanism 
through which nations can render their local governments liable to 
direct suit, but few nations avail themselves of this opportunity.30 The 
EU and its member states also practice a form of direct liability in 
their economic agreements.31 The rule exists domestically as well. The 
United States Supreme Court held in Monell v. Dep’t. Social 
Services32 that local governments can be sued even where U.S. state 
governments—of which local governments are part—are immune 
under the Eleventh Amendment.33 
This Article argues that direct liability for subnational 
governments should replace strict vicarious liability and immunity in 
international economic law. This proposal has two components. First, 
under the international law of state responsibility, local governments 
should be directly responsible for their breaches of international 
economic obligations. Second, grants of jurisdiction to international 
tribunals to resolve trade and investment disputes should be 
understood to include jurisdiction over claims against subnational 
governments unless otherwise specified.34 
This rule would have a number of beneficial consequences. First, 
local governments presently externalize all international liability for 
their actions. When a U.S. state or Canadian province violates an 
 
 29. See infra Section II.B. 
 30. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, art. 25(1), 25(3), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 
1270, 575 U.NT.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
 31. See infra Section I.C. 
 32. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 33. Id. at 690. 
 34. International law distinguishes between the law of state responsibility and 
jurisdiction. The law of state responsibility describes when a state is responsible for a 
breach of international law and the consequences thereof. See generally Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, at 
31, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility], http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XPT-F95X] (“These articles 
seek to formulate	.	.	.	the basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of 
States for their internationally wrongful acts.”). A state may have responsibility even if no 
tribunal has jurisdiction. The concept of direct liability argued for here encompasses both 
the notion of state responsibility and jurisdiction. Essentially, local governments would be 
amenable to jurisdiction and responsible under international law to the same extent as 
their parent states. 
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international legal obligation, the federal government has no 
mechanism to recoup from the local government the costs of either 
defending the suit or any resulting liability.35 Thus, monetary awards 
against the United States or Canada under an investment agreement 
for violations by a subnational government are paid by the national 
government, not by the responsible local government.36 Neither can 
the federal government easily control the actions of local 
governments. Resource constraints prevent federal governments in 
large nations from monitoring all local government action. Moreover, 
political and legal constraints make preempting local acts difficult at 
best. For example, the United States federal government has the 
power to seek a declaratory judgment that a state or local law is 
preempted because it conflicts with U.S. obligations under the WTO 
founding agreements.37 As far as I am aware, the federal government 
has never exercised this authority. 
Second, a move to direct liability would have beneficial 
distributional and welfare consequences. Strict vicarious liability is 
only a default rule. The countries that most frequently push to change 
the default rule are large federal states such as the United States, 
Canada, Mexico, and Australia.38 These powerful and wealthy 
countries obtain immunity for their state and provincial governments, 
which often have expansive regulatory powers.39 Meanwhile, many 
weaker developing nations are centralized and thus do not benefit 
from immunity for discriminatory regional acts. The result is that 
federal countries may be permitted to discriminate at a higher rate 
than unitary countries. In general, permitting discrimination to 
continue is bad both for the unitary countries discriminated against, 
as well as the consumers in the discriminating federal countries who 
pay higher prices for goods, services, and capital as a result of their 
own government’s discrimination.40 
 
 35. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 36. See infra notes 74–82 and accompanying text. 
 37. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §	3512(c)(2) (2012) (“It is 
the intention of Congress	.	.	.	to occupy the field with respect to any cause of action or 
defense under or in connection with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including by 
precluding any person other than the United States from bringing any action against any 
State or political subdivision thereof or raising any defense to the application of State 
law	.	.	.	.”). 
 38. See infra Section I.B. 
 39. See infra Section I.B. 
 40. See Timothy Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public 
Goods, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1937, 1942 (2015) (noting that “[f]oreign businesses and 
disfavored domestic consumers absorb the economic costs [of discrimination]”). 
Discrimination does create benefits for protected domestic producers and the politicians 
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Third and finally, direct liability recognizes the considerably 
more important role subnational governments play in international 
affairs today. Strict vicarious liability pretends that the world is a 
place in which actions with global consequences originate primarily in 
national capitals. Yet the nation-state’s role has receded in favor of 
both supranational and subnational action. Indeed, national 
governments frequently contemplate a role for local governments in 
fulfilling international objectives. To give but one example, on 
September 15, 2015, the top climate change negotiators from the 
United States and China met in Los Angeles.41 They did not meet to 
discuss national efforts to mitigate climate change; instead, they 
convened with the leaders of about a dozen American and Chinese 
cities, states, and provinces to discuss local measures that “are 
intended to support the achievement and implementation of each 
country’s respective post-2020 national climate targets.”42 Direct 
accountability is necessary to ensure that local governments can play 
their important role in international affairs responsibly and 
constructively. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I presents a novel survey 
of the three local liability rules used in international law. This survey 
demonstrates that immunity is on the rise. Part II analyzes these three 
rules in light of the regulatory and compensatory functions of liability; 
while strict vicarious liability and direct liability each have benefits, 
immunity is the least efficient rule. This framework presents a puzzle: 
if immunity is such an inefficient rule, why are nations increasingly 
using it? Part III provides the answer to this question, showing that 
large federal nations are willing to use their leverage in trade 
negotiations to reduce local liability that they cannot easily avoid as a 
matter of domestic law. Part IV considers the implications of the 
trend towards immunity for international economic law. Part V 
makes the case for direct liability as the default local liability rule. 
 
they support, although in general, these benefits are outweighed by the costs to foreign 
businesses and domestic consumers. Id. The exception to this rule is when discrimination 
promotes some non-economic objective, such as environmental protection or health and 
safety. See id. (arguing that discriminatory measures can facilitate the passage at the local 
level of global public goods measures such as renewable energy subsidies). 
 41. U.S.-CHINA CLIMATE LEADERS’ DECLARATION: ON THE OCCASION OF THE 
FIRST SESSION OF THE U.S.-CHINA CLIMATE-SMART/LOW-CARBON CITIES SUMMIT, 
LOS ANGELES, CA, SEPTEMBER 15–16, 2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/us_china_climate_leaders_declaration_9_14_15_730pm_final.pdf [http://perma.cc
/2WUP-6TU5]. 
 42. Id. 
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I.  THREE LIABILITY RULES 
This Part presents the first comprehensive review of 
international liability rules for local action. The default rule under 
international law is that a national government is vicariously liable for 
the actions of its subnational governments. Two alternative liability 
schemes exist, however: immunity and direct liability. Under 
immunity, a complainant does not have a claim against either the 
subnational government or the national government. Under direct 
liability, a complainant may make a claim directly against the 
subnational government. As documented below, immunity for local 
action is on the rise, but direct liability offers a promising alternative. 
A. Strict Vicarious Liability 
Strict vicarious liability (or “vicarious liability”) for national 
governments is the default rule under international law. The 
International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, which to a large extent reflect customary international 
law,43 provide that the “conduct of any State organ shall be 
considered an act of that State under international law	.	.	.	whatever 
its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial 
unit of the State.”44 Moreover, the draft articles provide that whether 
a state has committed an internationally wrongful act “is not affected 
by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.”45 
Indeed, these provisions are bedrock principles of international law, 
confirmed by dozens of cases.46 
As a result, states bear legal responsibility under international 
law for the actions of their local governments, even if the local 
government’s actions are made pursuant to an express allocation of 
authority between the national and local governments. The Consular 
Cases provide a perfect illustration. The United States lost a series of 
disputes before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),47 
culminating in the Avena48 judgment, which held that the United 
 
 43. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 34, at 84. 
 44. Id. (“[Article 4.1] includes an organ of any territorial governmental entity within 
the State on the same basis as the central governmental organs of that State	.	.	.	.”). 
 45. Id. at 36. 
 46. Id. at 75–90 & nn.78–125 (citing cases upholding these two principles). 
 47. See LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, ¶	128 (June 27); 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 248, 
¶	41 (Apr. 9). 
 48. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 
12 (Mar. 31). 
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States had violated the consular rights of Mexican nationals on death 
row in Texas.49 In fact, Texas (and other U.S. states) had violated the 
foreign nationals’ rights during the course of administering state 
criminal law, and the remedy prescribed by the ICJ would have 
required state court review of the foreign nationals’ convictions.50 In 
Medellin v. Texas,51 the Supreme Court held that the President lacked 
the ability to compel Texas to comply with the ICJ’s judgment.52 This 
lack of presidential authority domestically, however, had no impact 
on the United States’ international responsibility for the violations.53 
The traditional justification for vicarious liability is that “federal 
States vary widely in their structure and distribution of powers, 
and	.	.	.	in most cases the constituent units have no separate 
international legal personality of their own.”54 Because local 
governments generally lack legal personality under international law 
and therefore cannot bear legal responsibility, vicarious liability 
ensures that all domestic exercises of governmental authority can be 
reached by international law. In this sense, the rule holding a state 
accountable for the actions of its constituent parts has similar 
rationales to vicarious liability in tort law.55 
In principle, vicarious liability need not be strict. Just as domestic 
law sometimes only holds superiors responsible if they behave 
negligently in supervising their subordinates,56 so too one can imagine 
holding a state responsible only if it has failed to adequately exercise 
its oversight authority over local governments.57 Instead, international 
 
 49. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. ¶	153. 
 50. Id. at 64–67. 
 51. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 52. Id. at 523–32. 
 53. Id. at 504 (“No one disputes that the Avena decision—a decision that flows from 
the treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to 
Vienna Convention disputes—constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the 
United States. But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding 
federal law enforceable in United States courts.”). 
 54. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 34, at 42. 
 55. See ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (2013); see also Attila Atanar, How Strict Is Vicarious 
Liability? Reassessing the Enterprise Risk Theory, 64 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 63, 78–80 
(2006) (describing various rationales for vicarious liability, including the composite theory, 
under which an employee and an employer should be treated as a “single, unitary entity”). 
 56. Atanar, supra note 55, at 69 (discussing vicarious liability regimes in which the 
employer’s conduct must itself be wrongful or negligent before vicarious liability arises). 
 57. Inevitably, however, such an inquiry would raise messy questions about a state’s 
ability to oversee local government action. Who would determine whether the national 
government had legal authority to correct a violation by a local government: national 
courts or international tribunals? Even if a national government had the appropriate 
authority, would it be entitled to a defense based on capabilities? Would developing 
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law’s strict approach to vicarious liability follows what might be 
termed a lowest-cost avoider approach. National governments are 
better positioned than foreign governments to monitor and promote 
local government compliance with international law. This justification 
does not require that national governments have significant 
monitoring and supervisory capacity as an absolute matter. It turns 
only on relative capacity. This lowest-cost avoider rationale likely 
made sense in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when 
detailed information about foreign legal systems might not have been 
readily available overseas. Today, however, technology has greatly 
reduced the cost of researching foreign legal systems. National 
governments may therefore no longer have a comparative advantage 
in monitoring local action.58 
Until recently, nations were so enamored of vicarious liability 
that they actually sought to expand nations’ responsibility for local 
governments by imposing an affirmative duty on nations to supervise 
local government compliance with international economic treaties. 
This duty was independent of and additional to liability for breaches 
by local governments. Article 105 of NAFTA, for instance, provides 
that “[t]he Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken 
in order to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement, including 
their observance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by 
state and provincial governments.”59 Likewise, the WTO’s TBT 
Agreement contains an article on local governments. That article 
confirms that “[m]embers are fully responsible under this Agreement 
for the observance of all provisions of Article 2[,]” which provides the 
main substantive rules of the TBT Agreement.60 Going beyond 
confirming the default rule that states are responsible for local action, 
however, the TBT Agreement provides that “[m]embers shall 
formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in 
support of the observance of the provisions of Article 2 by other than 
central government bodies.”61 
As a result of vicarious liability, nations are regularly called upon 
to answer for the offenses of their local governments. To take but one 
example, the peace treaty between the Allies and Italy at the end of 
 
countries, for example, be less responsible for the actions of their local governments owing 
to their relative resource constraints? 
 58. See infra Section II.A. 
 59. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 105, Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 60. TBT Agreement, supra note 27, art. 3.5. 
 61. Id. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017) 
2017] LOCAL LIABILITY IN INT’L ECON. LAW 275 
World War II established an obligation on Italy to return property 
wrongfully taken from foreign nationals,62 as well as bilateral 
conciliation commissions to arbitrate disputes between such nationals 
and Italy.63 In Heirs of the Duc de Guise,64 a case involving an 
expropriation effected by the Sicilian government, the Franco-Italian 
Conciliation Commission made clear that “the Italian State is 
responsible for implementing the Peace Treaty, even for Sicily, 
notwithstanding the autonomy granted to Sicily in internal relations 
under the public law of the Italian Republic.”65 The Franco-Mexican 
Claims Commission reached a similar conclusion in a case involving 
the taking of assets of a French citizen by the Mexican State of 
Sonora.66 The commission noted that Mexico was responsible for the 
conduct of its subunits “even in cases where the federal constitution 
denies the central Government the right of control over the separate 
States or the right to require them to comply, in their conduct, with 
the rules of international law.”67 
Although an old rule, the significance of vicarious liability has 
dramatically increased with the creation of compulsory dispute 
resolution mechanisms in investment and trade agreements. Prior to 
the 1980s, state responsibility for local action existed in theory but 
could only be tested before a tribunal if the parties happened to agree 
to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Since then, however, 
economic relations between states have been heavily judicialized. 
Today over 2,500 BITs, preferential trade agreements such as 
NAFTA and the TPP, and the WTO itself give international tribunals 
compulsory jurisdiction over claims arising under those treaties.68 
 
 62. Treaty of Peace with Italy art. 75, ¶	1, Feb. 10, 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 747 
(“Italy	.	.	.	shall return, in the shortest time possible, property removed from the territory 
of any of the United Nations.”). 
 63. Id. art. 83. 
 64. 13 R.I.A.A. 150 (Franco-Italian Conciliation Comm’n 1951), translated in Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 34, at 88. 
 65. Id. at 161.  
 66. Estate of Hyacinthe Pellat v. United Mexican States (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R.I.A.A. 534 
(1929), translated in Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 34, at 89. 
 67. Id. at 89. Interestingly, in its commentaries, the International Law Commission 
notes that strict vicarious liability was not consistently followed until the late nineteenth 
century, although it has consistently been followed since then. See id. at 88. 
 68. See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 40–41 (2009) (chronicling the rise of, and subsequent changes to, 
bilateral and regional investment agreements); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment 
Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 125–28 (2003) 
(discussing developing countries’ increased use of BITs in recent years to attract capital 
from multinational companies). 
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State responsibility for local action is thus engaged with considerably 
greater frequency today than ever before. 
NAFTA investor-state disputes clarify this trend. Investors have 
filed seventy-eight claims total against the three NAFTA parties—
thirty-eight claims against Canada,69 twenty claims against Mexico,70 
and twenty claims against the United States.71 Of these, thirty-three 
challenge local action.72 Put differently, an astonishingly high 41% of 
the investment claims brought under NAFTA—the largest 
preferential trade agreement between federal countries currently in 
force—seek to hold federal governments responsible for local 
action.73 
Canada, the most frequent respondent under NAFTA chapter 
11, also has the highest percentage of claims involving local action. 
Twenty-two of its thirty-eight claims involve local action, a 
remarkable 58% of claims.74 These claims have created substantial 
liability for Canada. For example, Canada settled the 
AbitibiBowater75 dispute, in which Newfoundland and Labrador 
expropriated the assets of a U.S. timber company, for $130 million 
dollars.76 Moreover, Canada, like most federal countries, had no 
domestic mechanism to impose this loss on the provincial 
government.77 Following the settlement, Canadian Prime Minister 
 
 69. See Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFF. CAN., http://
www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff
/gov.aspx?lang=eng [http://perma.cc/LLS4-7N6M] (last modified Apr. 7, 2016). International 
investment disputes are not reported with the same transparency as federal cases. While 
the Canadian government maintains a transparent and up-to-date website of its claims, 
identifying claims against the United States and Mexico involve searching out more 
comprehensive lists of disputes than those maintained by the respective governments. 
 70. See Todd Weiler, Disputes with Mexico, NAFTACLAIMS.COM, http://www.naftaclaims
.com/disputes-with-mexico.html [https://perma.cc/Q5SC-8H57] [hereinafter Disputes with 
Mexico]. 
 71. See Todd Weiler, Disputes with USA, NAFTACLAIMS.COM, http://www
.naftaclaims.com/disputes-with-usa.html [https://perma.cc/62CE-3SL5] [hereinafter Disputes 
with USA]. 
 72. See Disputes with Mexico, supra note 70; Disputes with USA, supra note 71. 
 73. See Disputes with Mexico, supra note 70; Disputes with USA, supra note 71. 
 74. Twenty-one cases against Canada either were completed or are ongoing, while 
sixteen were withdrawn or are inactive. Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, 
supra note 69. Of the former category, fourteen involved local action, while eight of the 
latter category involved local action. Id. 
 75. See Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada: AbitibiBowater Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFF. CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/AbitibiBowater.aspx?lang=eng 
[http://perma.cc/SD87-D548]. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Bertrand Marotte & John Ibbitson, Provinces on Hook for Future Trade Disputes: 
Harper, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 26, 2010, 3:49 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com
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Stephen Harper said he would consider legislation to create such a 
mechanism if provincial governments continued to act irresponsibly.78 
Only five out of the twenty cases—25%—against the United 
States involve local action.79 These claims, however, challenge a 
number of different U.S. states and a wide range of regulatory 
activity. Several of them challenged environmental regulations in 
California,80 while one challenged Mississippi state court rulings 
concerning funeral parlors.81 Another challenged a Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court decision holding that the claimant could not 
recover for intentional torts committed by authorities in Boston.82 Yet 
another case sought between $310 and $664 million on the grounds 
that the master settlement agreement U.S. state attorneys general 
entered into with the tobacco industry in the late 1990s—which 
provided the most comprehensive regulation of the tobacco industry 
at that time—discriminated against Canadian cigarette producers.83 
For Mexico, six of its twenty claims involve local action, many 
challenging zoning and environmental decisions.84 
The WTO has also seen its share of claims challenging local 
action. Out of 502 cases filed to date, at least forty-one have 
challenged subnational action (including, as explained below, claims 
against EU member states)—a bit more than eight percent of cases.85 
 
/report-on-business/provinces-on-hook-in-future-trade-disputes-harper/article1378647/ [http://
perma.cc/5N97-GQSR] (noting Canada’s lack of such a mechanism and the potential need 
to create one in the future). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Disputes with USA, supra note 71. 
 80. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, at 26–32 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. 
Tri. June 8, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4TZQ-V65Z]; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Award, ¶¶	3–8 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0529.pdf [http://perma.cc/WB3G-HTAL]. 
 81. See Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 
¶	3 (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005). 
 82. See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 
¶¶	1, 139–40 (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 182 (2004). 
 83. See Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶	1 (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0384
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWZ7-LNEK]. 
 84. See Disputes with Mexico, supra note 70. 
 85. To access the underlying data for this analysis, see Chronological List of Dispute 
Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e
.htm [https://perma.cc/GM3L-DXF3]. I arrived at this number by examining the requests 
for consultations in WTO disputes, current as of January 2016. This number may 
underestimate the number of disputes involving local measures if a party did not name a 
local measure in its request for consultations. I also followed the WTO’s system of 
numbering disputes, counting each dispute to which the WTO gave an individual number 
as an individual dispute, even if two disputes were linked. Thus, for example, I counted the 
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Fourteen of those cases challenged action taken by provinces or states 
within federal countries. Moreover, thirteen of these cases were 
brought against the United States or Canada (the last targeted 
provincial measures in Belgium).86 The EU and Japan, for example, 
challenged a Massachusetts law that prohibited the state from 
procuring goods or services from anyone doing business with, or in, 
Myanmar.87 In the famous Gambling88 case, Antigua and Barbuda 
successfully challenged allegedly discriminatory limitations on the 
provision of online gambling services from outside the United States 
(given that gambling is legal within the United States). Antigua and 
Barbuda named laws in each of the fifty states, as well as Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.89 Finally, a number of 
disputes challenged state and provincial subsidies for industries such 
as aircrafts and renewable energy.90 
Outside of North America, twenty-eight cases challenged actions 
by EU member states.91 EU member states function in trade and 
investment matters more as subnational units of a federal state than 
as independent nations. Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU, which came into effect in 2009, provides that trade in 
goods, trade in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, and foreign direct investment are all part of the EU’s 
common commercial policy.92 The common commercial policy, in 
 
EU’s and Japan’s challenges to Ontario’s Feed-in Tariff Program as two disputes because 
the WTO gave the disputes two numbers (DS412 and DS426). 
 86. See Request for Consultations by the Russian Federation, European Union and Its 
Member States—Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector, ¶¶	2–5, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS476/1 (Apr. 30, 2015) [hereinafter EU—Energy]. 
 87. See Request for Consultations by Japan, United States—Measure Affecting 
Government Procurement, at 1, WTO Doc. GPA/D3/1 WT/DS95/1 (July 18, 1997). This 
issue was resolved on supremacy clause grounds in litigation in the United States. See 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000). 
 88. Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS285/1 (Apr. 1, 2003). 
 89. Id. Annex I & II.  
 90. See Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 23, ¶	5.85; U.S.—Aircraft, supra note 
24, at 567; Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities and 
Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶¶	1–6, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS347/1 (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter EC—Aircraft]. 
 91. One case, Request for Consultations by the Russian Federation, European Union 
and its Member States, at 1–3, WTO Doc. WT/DS476/1 (May 8, 2014), challenged both EU 
member states’ actions, as well as actions within an EU member state, Belgium. As a 
consequence, this case counts as both a challenge to a provincial measure and an EU 
member state. This explains why there are forty-one local WTO cases, but twenty-eight 
such cases against EU member states and fourteen against regional actors. 
 92. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 207, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 140. 
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turn, is a matter of EU exclusive competence, meaning that the EU 
has jurisdiction and its member states do not.93 Nevertheless, just as 
U.S. states and Canadian provinces can trigger claims against their 
national governments, so too can EU member states trigger claims 
against the EU.94 Not surprisingly, these claims look very similar to 
those claims against North American state and provincial 
governments. They involve, for example, subsidies for aircraft 
manufacturers;95 energy regulation, including cases regarding 
renewable energy markets;96 a handful of product regulations, such as 
limitations on asbestos or the products made from seal skins;97 and 
challenges to tax measures.98 
 
 93. Allan Rosas, EU External Relations: Exclusive Competence Revisited, 38 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1073, 1081 (2015) (“It thus became clear that these areas are 
included in the concept of common commercial policy and thus are covered by TFEU 
Article 3(1)(e), providing for an exclusive competence in the area of ‘common commercial 
policy.”). 
 94. Whether a claim is or was brought against the EU or a member state directly 
depends on the allocation of authority between the EU and its member states at the time 
the challenge is brought. This allocation of authority, regarding both international 
economic policy and defending international claims, has shifted over time. See Frank 
Hoffmeister, Litigating Against the European Union and Its Member States—Who 
Responds Under the ILC’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International 
Organizations?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 723, 724 (2010) (describing the international law rules 
for responsibility of claims between the European Union and its member states). 
 95. EC—Aircraft, supra note 90, ¶¶	2–6; U.S.—Aircraft, supra note 24, ¶	1348; 
Request for Consultations by the European Union, United States—Conditional Tax 
Incentives for Large Civil Aircraft, ¶	II, WTO Doc. WT/DS487/1 (Dec. 19, 2014). 
 96. See EU—Energy, supra note 86, at 2–5; Request for Consultations by Argentina, 
European Union and Certain Member States—Certain Measures on the Importation and 
Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, ¶¶	1–11, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS459/1 (Dec. 19, 2014). 
 97. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶	58, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/1 (adopted Mar. 12, 2001); 
Panel Reports, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and 
Marketing of Seal Products, ¶	7.7, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/1 (adopted Nov. 25, 2013); 
Request for Consultations by Norway, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶¶	1–2, WTO Doc. WT/DS401/1 (Oct. 21, 
2010). 
 98. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by the United States, France—Certain Income 
Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, ¶	1, WTO Doc. WT/DS131/1 (May 11, 1998); 
Request for Consultations by the United States, Ireland—Certain Income Tax Measures 
Constituting Subsidies, ¶	1, WTO Doc. WT/DS130/1 (May 11, 1998); Request for 
Consultations by the United States, Greece—Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting 
Subsidies, ¶	1, WTO Doc. WT/DS129/1 (May 11, 1998). These cases proceed against the 
individual member states because tax policy is within the competence of individual EU 
members. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017) 
280 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
As this case law makes clear, strict vicarious liability is a rule 
with teeth.99 Nations and private investors frequently challenge the 
legality of the actions of local governments in other jurisdictions. 
Frequently, they win. The national government is left holding the bag, 
either paying compensation to investors or grappling with a 
settlement or the possibility of countermeasures within the WTO. 
Ironically, this very success in terms of creating means to adjudicate 
international economic law disputes has put pressure on the system. 
Vicarious liability has become much costlier for states now that they 
can and are regularly called before tribunals to defend actions that 
they themselves have not taken.100 Vicarious liability makes federal 
nations, in particular, defense counsel for their local governments—a 
position in which they may not wish to be. 
B. Immunity 
In response to the surge in challenges to local action, national 
governments in the twenty-first century have increasingly changed 
their treaty practices to limit international responsibility for local 
action. The overwhelming trend is to replace vicarious liability with 
immunity for existing discriminatory measures.101 As used here, 
immunity refers to a rule that exempts a state from liability it would 
otherwise face. In this sense, immunity is broader than simply a 
jurisdictional immunity from suit. It includes limitations on the 
substantive application of international legal rules to local conduct.102 
 
 99. See Gerard Conway, Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of 
Member States, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 679, 684–85 (2002) (describing vicarious liability for 
member states arising from the actions of organizations belonging to the member state). 
 100. See Alan O. Sykes & Eric Posner, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual 
Responsibility Under International Law 16–19 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 279, 2006), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1042&context=law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/V2QK-B2JH] (extrapolating 
the adverse economic effects on member states of vicarious liability). 
 101. See infra notes 131–37 and accompanying text. 
 102. The use of immunity in this broad sense, rather than merely jurisdictional 
immunity, is significant because under international law, the notion of responsibility or 
liability is completely divorced from the existence of a tribunal’s jurisdiction over a 
dispute. Many, if not most, international agreements prohibit an international tribunal 
from exercising jurisdiction over disputes. Jurisdiction exists only when states expressly 
consent to it, which they usually do not. States remain responsible to each other, however, 
for violations of international law. For example, the United States withdrew from the 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) that granted 
the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes. While this action removed the basis for jurisdiction, the 
United States remains responsible under international law for violations of the VCCR. See 
John Quigley,	 The United States’ Withdrawal from International Court of Justice 
Jurisdiction in Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
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The 2004 U.S. Model BIT offers an illustrative example of a 
treaty provision that creates immunity for local action. Article 14, 
entitled “Non-Conforming Measures,” provides that the treaty’s rules 
forbidding discrimination against foreign investors and investments 
(nondiscrimination rules) do not apply to existing non-conforming 
measures, or any amendment or renewal thereto, at the local level of 
government or at the regional level of government if a party so 
declares.103 In its BITs concluded since 2004, the United States has 
declared that the treaties’ nondiscrimination rules do not apply to 
“[a]ll existing non-conforming measures of all states of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.”104 Identical 
provisions can be found in both the investment and services chapters 
of recent multilateral trade agreements, such as the Central America-
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”),105 as 
well as bilateral trade agreements, such as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (“KORUS”),106 U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
(“U.S.-Australia FTA”),107 the U.S.-Colombia FTA,108 and the U.S.-
 
263, 263–64 (2009) (explaining the jurisdictional implications of United States’ withdrawal 
from the VCCR). 
 103. See 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 14, http://www.state.gov
/documents/organization/117601.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8U5-AFGC]. Specifically, the 
exemption applies to the national treatment obligation, the most-favored nation 
obligation, the ban on performance requirements, and nondiscrimination rules with 
respect to senior management and boards of directors. Id.arts. 3–4, 8–9. This language was 
carried forward to the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. See 2012 U.S. Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 14, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS93-B68N]. 
 104. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, Rwanda-U.S., Annex I, art. 14, Feb. 19, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 12-101; Treaty 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Uru.-U.S., 
Annex I, Nov. 4, 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101 [hereinafter Uruguay-U.S. BIT]. The United 
States has also attempted to contract out of international responsibility for state actions in 
non-economic areas through so-called “federalism reservations.” These reservations 
purport to exclude from the United States’ obligations any actions for which the U.S. 
Constitution allocates authority to the states. See U.S. Ratification of United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime ¶	1, ratified Nov. 3, 2005, 2346 
U.N.T.S. 440 (“The United States of America reserves the right to assume obligations 
under the Convention in a manner consistent with its fundamental principles of 
federalism	.	.	.	.”). 
 105. Free Trade Agreement, Cent. Am.-Dom. Rep.-U.S., arts. 10.13, 11.6, 12.9, Jan. 28, 
2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004). 
 106. Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., arts. 11.12, 12.6, 13.9, Annex I, June 30, 2007 
[hereinafter KORUS FTA], http://www.wipo.int/edocs/trtdocs/en/kr-us/trt_kr_us.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZB5V-3SQK]. 
 107. Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., arts. 10.6, 11.13, 13.8, Annex I-Australia-2, 
Annex I-United States-12, May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 (2004) [hereinafter Austl.-U.S. 
FTA]. 
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Chile FTA,109 among others. The culmination of this trend in U.S. 
practice is the inclusion of identical provisions in the investment and 
services chapters of the TPP.110 
Significantly, in most of these agreements the United States is 
the only party to make a declaration with respect to regional levels of 
government. The exceptions are the U.S.-Australia FTA, where both 
parties exempted all regional measures,111 and the TPP, where 
Australia, Canada, Mexico, and the United States all adopted this 
approach.112 As a result, all parties to these agreements receive 
immunity for the acts of truly local governments. However, the 
United States (along with the other federal nations in the TPP) 
receives an additional exemption for state and provincial 
governments.113 
The significance of this distinction in a federal country cannot be 
overstated. The scope of regulatory activity at the U.S. state level is 
massive. For example, professional licensing is done almost entirely at 
the state level in the United States.114 Licensing schemes restrict who 
can provide certain services,115 and therefore have significant 
implications for efforts to liberalize trade in services. The immunity 
provisions that are now standard in economic treaties insulate 
discriminatory aspects of licensing schemes from challenge in 
perpetuity, so long as they are not allowed to lapse. The same can be 
said of zoning and land-use ordinances, which are local laws. These 
provisions have been the source of a number of investment disputes, 
especially against Mexico.116 Once again, so long as they remain in 
 
 108. Trade Promotion Agreement, Colom.-U.S., arts. 10.13, 11.6, 12.9, Annex I-US-13, 
Nov. 22, 2006, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-
text [https://perma.cc/6E3D-K4MF]. 
 109. Free Trade Agreement, Chile-U.S., arts. 10.7, 11.6, 12.9 & Annex I-US-14, June 6, 
2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003). 
 110. See TPP, supra note 10, arts. 9.12 & 10.7. 
 111. Austl.-U.S. FTA, supra note 107, arts. 10.6, 11.13, Annex I-Australia-2, Annex I-
United States 12. 
 112. See TPP, supra note 10, arts. 9.12, 10.7 & Annex I. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed 
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2014) (“[N]early a 
third of American workers need a state license to perform their job legally, and this trend 
toward licensing is continuing. The service sector—the most likely to be covered by 
licensing—has grown enormously, with its share of nonfarm employment growing from 
roughly 40% in 1950 to over 60% in 2007.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶	74–112 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 209 (2002) (holding that 
Mexico violated NAFTA chapter 11’s fair and equitable treatment and expropriation 
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effect, discriminatory aspects of those schemes are immune to 
challenge under the TPP or its ilk. Indeed, in the United States the 
states are thought to have plenary police powers, while the federal 
government is one of enumerated powers. Although the reality is 
somewhat different—the modern federal government has successfully 
regulated nearly everything it has tried to regulate—the fact remains 
that the daily operations of businesses and lives of ordinary people 
remain more closely tied to state and local laws. Exempting those 
laws from challenge thus creates a major hole in the 
nondiscrimination provisions of economic treaties. 
The relative size of the exempted economies provides another 
clue as to the scope of the exemptions immunity creates. A 
comparison of nominal GDP data indicates that California alone has 
the sixth largest economy in the world, exceeding the economies of 
Brazil, India, Russia, and France.117 Indeed, California’s GDP exceeds 
all other TPP signatories’ except for Japan.118 Texas and New York 
equal or exceed the GDPs of all TPP signatories except Japan, 
Canada, and Australia.119 Excluding Japan and the four federal TPP 
nations, nineteen U.S. states have annual nominal GDPs that exceed 
the next largest TPP economy, Singapore.120 The top three Canadian 
provinces—Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta—all have higher GDPs 
than half of the TPP’s signatories.121 
As a result, immunity creates asymmetric pressure on nations to 
liberalize their economies. Immunity exempts an enormous swath of 
local laws in federal countries from nondiscrimination rules. The 
exempted laws cover state and provincial economies that in many 
cases dwarf the economies of small, less developed, centralized 
 
provisions through the actions of its subnational governments in denying permits for a 
landfill). 
 117. Compare Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State (Millions of Current Dollars), 
U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/drilldown.cfm?reqid=70&stepnum
=11&AreaTypeKeyGdp=5&GeoFipsGdp=XX&ClassKeyGdp=NAICS&ComponentKey
=200&IndustryKey=1&YearGdp=2015Q2&YearGdpBegin=-1&YearGdpEnd=-1&UnitOf
MeasureKeyGdp=Levels&RankKeyGdp=1&Drill=1&nRange=5 [https://perma.cc/MYT4-
GBQD] [hereinafter 2015 State GDP] (listing U.S. state GDPs for 2015), with Gross 
Domestic Product 2014, WORLD BANK [hereinafter 2014 World GDP], https://
web.archive.org/web/20160624102936/http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ4F-BRWX] (listing national GDPs for 2014). 
 118. Compare 2015 State GDP, supra note 117, with 2014 World GDP, supra note 117. 
 119. Compare 2015 State GDP, supra note 117, with 2014 World GDP, supra note 117. 
 120. Compare 2015 State GDP, supra note 117, with 2014 World GDP, supra note 117. 
 121. Compare 2014 World GDP, supra note 117, with Gross Domestic Product, 
Expenditure-Based, by Province and Territory, STAT. CAN., http://www.statcan.gc.ca
/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/econ15-eng.htm [https://perma.cc/8DL5-UGQA] (last 
modified Nov. 10, 2015). 
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nations. Yet these same centralized countries have no similar 
comprehensive exemption for discriminatory regulations—such as 
professional licensing regimes—that they promulgate at the central 
level of government.122 Indeed, the sweeping nature of the U.S. 
declaration of exemption for its states caused South Korea to demand 
the inclusion of an illustrative list of exempted state-level measures in 
the KORUS Agreement.123 
To be sure, these provisions do not create all-encompassing 
immunity. First, the immunity applies only to the treaty’s 
nondiscrimination rules.124 Rules on expropriation and a minimum 
standard of treatment are fully applicable, for example.125 This 
limitation is important, but discrimination claims are often easier for a 
challenger to win. Tribunals may be more comfortable finding that a 
government acted unlawfully when the government itself establishes 
the applicable standard of conduct through its behavior towards 
similarly situated parties. For example, in Feldman v. Mexico,126 an 
American company challenged Mexico’s inconsistent application of 
tax rebates for the export of gray market cigarettes.127 The tribunal 
rejected Feldman’s expropriation claim, while nevertheless 
acknowledging that Feldman had been treated “in a less than 
reasonable manner.”128 Yet on the same facts the tribunal ruled in 
favor of Feldman on his discrimination claim, since a similarly 
situated Mexican company received more favorable treatment than 
Feldman.129 
Second, these exemptions on their face apply only to non-
conforming measures in existence at the time the treaty comes into 
force. All new local action is fully subject to the treaty’s rules. While a 
significant limitation on the scope of immunity, amendments or 
reenactments of existing measures are also immunized from 
 
 122. To be sure, each country does have an opportunity to enter its own list of 
exemptions. Countries often, for example, tailor their commitments in the financial 
services sector. They do not, however, take the across-the-board geographic approach to 
exemptions taken by federal countries. 
 123. KORUS FTA, supra note 106, art. 11.12 ¶¶	1–5. 
 124. See TPP, supra note 10, arts. 9.12, 10.7. 
 125. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 10, art. 9.12 (stating that the non-conforming provisions 
apply only to the National Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, Performance 
Requirements, and Senior Management and Boards of Directors provisions). 
 126. Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, ¶	1 
(Dec. 16, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 341 (2005). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. ¶	113. 
 129. Id. ¶	188. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017) 
2017] LOCAL LIABILITY IN INT’L ECON. LAW 285 
challenge.130 In practice, then, savvy local governments (or national 
governments defending suits) can relate their new discriminatory acts 
to non-conforming acts existing at the treaty’s entry into force. This 
introduces another asymmetry. Sophisticated governments can design 
their discriminatory actions to take advantage of the exception for 
renewals, amendments, and modifications. Unsophisticated 
governments, even in federal states, are unlikely to follow suit. 
Practically speaking, the result will be that large, wealthy regional 
governments, such as California and Ontario, are likely to benefit 
more from immunity than are small, poor regional governments. 
Critically, immunity for local action is not limited to U.S. treaty 
practice. Other federal nations regularly include similar provisions in 
their economic treaties. Canada’s 2004 Model BIT contains a 
provision substantially similar to article 14 of the U.S. Model BIT.131 
Similarly, India added a new exemption for truly local government 
action in its 2015 Model BIT.132 The Canada-EU Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”) includes a similar 
provision exempting all truly local measures and listed measures at 
the provincial and EU member state level, although neither Canada 
nor the EU entered blanket exemptions for the latter.133 The 2015 
Australia-China FTA exempts existing local and listed regional 
measures for services.134 For investment, however, the agreement 
exempts all local and regional measures for Australia, and all existing 
non-conforming measures in all of China, including central 
government measures.135 The Canada-China FTA contains a similar 
provision, although the exemption for existing non-conforming 
 
 130. 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 103, art. 14(b)–(c). 
 131. 2004 Model Canadian Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 9, http://www.italaw.com
/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/59V7-B26L] (providing 
that the treaty’s nondiscrimination rules shall not apply to measures adopted by sub-
national governments, where sub-national governments are defined to include both local 
and regional governments). 
 132. Compare 2015 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 2.4(i), 
http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/investment_diviion/ModelBIT_Annex.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4XM6-BCUP] (providing that the “Treaty shall not apply to any measure 
by a local government”), with 2003 Indian Model Text of BIPA, http://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/archive/ita1026.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5Q3-W8PY] (containing no 
such language). 
 133. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, arts. 8.15(1)(a), 
9.7(1)(a), 13.10(1)(a), 13.10(2)(a), 14.4(1)(a), Oct. 30, 2016 [hereinafter Canada-EU Trade 
Agreement], http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U39M-5KFJ]. 
 134. Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-China, art. 8.9, Nov. 17, 2014, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3454 [https://perma.cc/NJC3-K7UA]. 
 135. Id. art. 9.5. 
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measures applies to all such measures in both countries.136 China, in 
other words, demands complete exemption for all its existing non-
conforming measures as the price for agreeing to federal states’ 
immunity for sub-national actions. As one of the world’s largest 
markets, China is in a position to extract concessions from other 
countries in a way that countries with smaller markets—such as 
Central and South American states—are not.137 
Finally, some states follow a “positive list” approach in trade 
negotiations. Under the positive list approach, the default rule is that 
economic activity is not covered by liberalization commitments unless 
a state specifically opts into it.138 In effect, a positive list approach 
makes immunity the default rule and state responsibility the 
exception. The positive list approach is often associated with the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).139 The GATS 
divides obligations into “General Obligations and Disciplines” and 
“Specific Commitments.”140 The General Obligations and 
Disciplines—which include the most favored nation obligation—
create state responsibility across the board.141 
The Specific Commitments—which include the national 
treatment obligation not to discriminate in favor of one’s own 
nationals—applies only to sectors into which states opt.142 By opting 
in, federal states can limit their commitments in regard to local 
governments. For example, many of the United States’ commitments 
 
 136. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Can.-China, art. 8.2, Sept. 9, 2014, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download
/TreatyFile/3476 [https://perma.cc/24U4-MKYN]. Articles 5–7 do not apply to any existing 
non-conforming measures maintained within the territory of a contracting party. See id. 
arts. 5–7. 
 137. China’s exemption for all existing non-conforming measures seems to be a 
standard provision in its trade agreements. The exemption appears in agreements, such as 
the China-South Korea FTA, that do not involve federal countries. See, e.g., Free Trade 
Agreement, China-S. Kor., art. 12.3, Jun. 1, 2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org
/Download/TreatyFile/3461 [https://perma.cc/KGJ9-HY9H] (“Paragraph 1 [National 
Treatment] shall not apply to non-conforming measures, if any, existing at the date of 
entry into force of this Chapter	.	.	.	.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in 
Search of a Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 111 (2003) (describing the positive 
list approach). 
 139. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter 
GATS]. 
 140. Id. Annex 1B. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. art. XX, ¶	1 (“Each Member shall set out in a schedule the specific 
commitments it undertakes	.	.	.	.” (emphasis added)). 
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in its GATS schedule include limitations based on state law.143 Other 
agreements, such as the WTO’s Agreement on Government 
Procurement, follow a similar approach.144 The positive list approach 
does not target local action specifically. However, by limiting those 
local measures listed or carving out local measures from more general 
commitments, as is done in the United States’ GATS schedule, 
countries can use the positive list approach to achieve the same effect 
as under immunity. 
Taken together, these provisions suggest that large federal 
nations now routinely exempt their local governments from the 
nondiscrimination rules in investment and trade in services 
agreements. These provisions, however, have significant asymmetric 
components. For federal states, they exempt significant amounts of 
regulation applying to large regional economies. Moreover, powerful, 
relatively centralized countries like China have met this demand with 
even broader exceptions to its liberalization commitments. Smaller 
centralized states, however, receive no similar exemption. Immunity 
thus risks reinforcing the view that international economic law 
perpetuates or even exacerbates existing inequalities. 
C. Direct Liability 
Direct liability against local governments—in which a claimant 
can challenge the local government itself—is international law’s third, 
and rarest, liability rule.145 As practiced, direct liability has two 
components: (1) the local government is itself responsible for the 
breach of international obligations and (2) jurisdiction exists over the 
local government at least to the extent it exists over the national 
government. 
Direct liability in international law generally takes the form of 
joint and several liability, meaning that the national government 
retains responsibility for the local government to the extent the 
former does not resolve any liability arising from its violations. Joint 
and several liability can work in at least two ways. In some cases, such 
as local responsibility under the ICSID Convention, a claim can 
proceed directly against a local government.146 In these cases, the 
 
 143. See, e.g., id. Annex on Financial Services ¶	2 (listing state law limitations on 
market access and national treatment commitments in the financial services sector). 
 144. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter 
GPA]. 
 145. See infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
 146. ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 25(1). 
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national government’s international responsibility still exists, but it is 
satisfied by a judgment against the local government.147 Moreover, 
jurisdiction may not exist over the national government. The local 
government may have consented to arbitrate an investment dispute 
with an investor, while the national government may not have. In 
other cases, such as the EU and its member states’ liability under the 
WTO Agreements, jurisdiction exists over both the superior and 
subordinate governments and, in theory, both can be held 
responsible.148 The key idea, however, is that under direct liability, the 
local government itself is subject to claims, even if the national 
government may evade a tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
Like immunity, creating direct liability requires a treaty 
provision. Article 25 of the ICSID Convention is perhaps the most 
important such provision in a multilateral agreement. The ICSID 
Convention established the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) as an institution affiliated with the 
World Bank and charged ICSID with resolving investment disputes 
between states and foreign investors.149 Article 25 states,  
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting 
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting 
State designated to the Centre by that State) and the national of 
another Contracting State	.	.	.	.150 
Thus, member states can permit their local governments (or other 
units) to act as respondents for cases involving their own actions.151 
 
 147. Id. art. 53(1) (“The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject 
to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.”). 
 148. See GPA, supra note 144, arts. XI, XIV (describing how European member states 
and the European communities (now the EU) can both become WTO members). 
 149. See ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 1 (“There is hereby established the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes	.	.	.	.”). 
 150. Id. (emphasis added). 
 151. The local government itself must still consent to the claim, just as the national 
government would have to. Id. art. 25(3) (“Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency 
of a Contracting State shall require the approval of that State unless that State notifies the 
Centre that no such approval is required.”). In Cable Television of Nevis Ltd. v. Federation 
of St. Kitts and Nevis, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/2, Award (Jan. 13, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 
106 (2002), an ICSID tribunal declined to find jurisdiction in a suit against the Nevis Island 
Administration (NIA), a subdivision of St. Kitts and Nevis. Id. ¶	2.33. Although the NIA 
had included an ICSID arbitration clause in its agreement with the complainant, St. Kitts 
and Nevis had neither designated the NIA as capable of participating directly nor 
consented to its participation. Id.; see also LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL 
BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 33 (2d ed. 2011). 
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States avail themselves of this opportunity infrequently, however.152 
Only twelve states have notified ICSID that subunits may participate 
directly in claims.153 Of these, eight states’ notifications deal only with 
commercial agencies (primarily state-owned oil companies).154 
The four states that have consented to claims directly against 
their subunits are Australia, Canada, Indonesia, and the United 
Kingdom.155 Of these four, Australia and Canada are the most 
interesting.156 Australia, a federal nation consisting of six states and 
two territories, consented in 1991 to direct suits against both of its 
territories and five out of its six states.157 Canada, long a notable 
holdout from the ICSID Convention, consented to suits against three 
of its provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario) shortly after 
it finally ratified the ICSID Convention in 2014.158 As discussed 
above, suits directly against Canadian provinces became an especially 
important issue after the AbitibiBowater settlement, with the 
Canadian federal government stating that it may pursue a mechanism 
 
 152. Even when states create direct liability, they remain internationally responsible 
for their local governments’ actions barring a treaty provision to the contrary. A 
designation under article 25 of the ICSID Convention is about jurisdiction, although the 
enforcement provisions of the ICSID Convention mean that the local government has 
substantive liability as well. See ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 25. 
 153. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Contracting States 
and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention, ICSID/8-C, at 2–3 (May 
2016) [hereinafter ICSID/8-C], https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs
/Documents/ICSID%208-Contracting%20States%20and%20Measures%20Taken%20by
%20Them%20for%20the%20Purpose%20of%20the%20Convention.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2NME-27A3]. 
 154. Id. Ecuador had also given consent to suit against several state-owned enterprises. 
Ecuador withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 2010, however. See Fernando Cabrera 
Diaz, Ecuador Prepares for Life After ICSID, While Debate Continues over Effect of Its 
Exit from the Centre, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/08
/28/ecuador-prepares-for-life-after-icsid-while-debate-continues-over-effect-of-its-exit-
from-the-centre/ [https://perma.cc/G6N7-2ZNM]. 
 155. ICSID/8-C, supra note 153, at 1–3. 
 156. Indonesia’s consent relates only to a single local government, while the United 
Kingdom’s relates to a number of its former colonies for which it continues to have 
international responsibility, such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. See id. at 2–3. 
 157. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Contracting States 
and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention, ICSID/8-A, at 1 (May 
2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/ICSID%208-
Contracting%20States%20and%20Measures%20Taken%20by%20Them%20for%20the
%20Purpose%20of%20the%20Convention.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NME-27A3]. The lone 
exception is the sparsely populated province of Western Australia. See ICSID/8-C, supra 
note 153, at 1. Interestingly, Western Australia’s economy is based heavily on the 
extractive sector, from which many investment claims arise. See RESOURCE CURSE OR 
CURE? ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA 1 (Martin 
Bruekner et al. eds., 2014). 
 158. ICSID/8-C, supra note 153, at 2. 
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to allow it to recoup the costs of successful claims against it based on 
provincial action.159 Direct liability under the ICSID Convention 
provides such a mechanism, one that does not require domestic 
legislation. 
The EU and its member states provide a more complicated 
example of direct liability. Of course, EU member states such as 
France and Germany are sovereign nations each with international 
legal personality in their own right.160 Historically, the EU and its 
member states are often both party to international economic 
agreements such as the WTO Agreements.161 When both the EU and 
its member states are party to an economic agreement, both can be 
internationally responsible for a breach of the agreement.162 Both are 
usually subject to jurisdiction under an economic agreement’s dispute 
resolution provisions as well.163 Under the WTO’s dispute settlement 
system, for example, complainants often name both the EU and the 
relevant member states in cases involving actions by the member 
states.164 
More recent free trade agreements give the EU the opportunity 
to tell a complainant which level of government will serve as 
respondent.165 CETA, the Canada-EU free trade agreement, provides 
that prior to initiating an investor-state arbitration, a claimant must 
“deliver to the European Union a notice requesting a determination 
of the respondent.”166 In the event that the EU does not make a 
determination within fifty days, the EU is the default respondent 
unless all of the challenged measures originate in a member state.167 
This approach retains a greater role for the member states than 
the EU itself initially (and perhaps ultimately) envisioned. In 2010, 
the European Commission (the EU’s executive body) published its 
views on a future common investment law policy.168 The commission 
 
 159. Marotte & Ibbitson, supra note 77; see also supra Section I.A.  
 160. Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?, 1 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 273, 274 (2000). 
 161. Id. at 275. 
 162. See Eva Steinberger, The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the 
EC’s and the EC Member States’ Membership of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 837, 838 
(2006). 
 163. See id. 
 164. See, e.g., EC—Aircraft, supra note 90, ¶¶	1–6. 
 165. Canada-EU Trade Agreement, supra note 133, art. 8.21. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—
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indicated that it believed itself to have exclusive competence for 
foreign direct investment under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.169 The commission took “the view that the 
European Union will also be the sole defendant regarding any 
measure taken by a Member State which affects investments by third 
country nationals or companies falling within the scope of the 
agreement concerned.”170 Despite its desire to be the sole defendant, 
however, the Commission was less enthusiastic about the financial 
responsibility that usually accompanies that role, indicating that it 
would pursue new legislation to allocate fiscal responsibility.171 
Recognizing that EU member states also have hundreds of BITs in 
force that make no mention of the EU, the Commission put forward 
legislation to govern the relationship between the EU and member 
states regarding BITs.172 In particular, even though member states 
remain primarily responsible, the regulation requires member states 
to consult with the EU in the event they are named a respondent, 
permit the EU’s participation as necessary, and initiate proceedings at 
the EU’s request.173 
Other federal systems offer additional examples of the direct role 
subnational governments can play in international legal affairs. A 
number of constitutions of federal nations—including Germany,174 
Switzerland,175 and Belgium176—grant subnational governments the 
right to enter into treaties on matters within the scope of their 
authority. While violations of such treaties might still give rise to 
 
Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, at 2, COM (2010) 
343 final (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter Comprehensive European Investment Policy]. 
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. Id. at 10. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See Commission Regulation 1219/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 40. 
 173. Id. at 44. 
 174. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 32(3) (Ger.), translation at http://www
.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/TL2T-9QYK] (“Insofar as 
the Länder have power to legislate, they may conclude treaties with foreign states with the 
consent of the Federal Government.”). 
 175. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 56, para. 
1 (Switz.), translated in FED. COUNCIL, FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SWISS 
CONFEDERATION 14 (June 14, 2015), https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation
/19995395/201506140000/101.pdf [https://perma.cc/X89V-CGQC] (“A Canton may conclude 
treaties with foreign states on matters that lie within the scope of its powers.”). 
 176. 1994 CONST. art. 127 (Belg.), translated in BELG. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
THE BELGIAN CONSTITUTION 37 (2009), https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Belgium_const
_1994.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA73-CK9U] (“The Parliaments of the Flemish and French 
communities	.	.	.	regulate by federate law	.	.	.	cooperation between the Communities, as 
well as international cooperation, including the concluding of treaties	.	.	.	.”). 
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international responsibility for the parent-state, they also create 
responsibility for the subnational government concluding the treaty.177 
Other countries, such as the United States, expressly forbid 
treaties between subnational governments and foreign countries.178 
As Duncan Hollis has demonstrated, however, U.S. states regularly 
enter into compacts with foreign nations on a wide range of issues 
without congressional consent or even reporting the compacts to the 
federal government.179 Likewise, in Canada the federal executive 
branch has sole responsibility for negotiating and concluding 
treaties.180 Nevertheless, Canadian provinces such as Quebec maintain 
their own set of “government offices” in a range of cities around the 
world, and Canadian provinces participated directly in the trade 
negotiations with the EU that led to CETA.181 
While these practices of U.S. states and Canadian provinces do 
not lead to international responsibility for those entities, they do 
indicate a robust level of participation in international relations. 
Moreover, they indicate a sophisticated capacity to engage in 
legalized international relationships. Coupled with the increasingly 
federalized nature of the EU, these examples demonstrate that legal 
personality and legal responsibility can and do filter down to multiple 
layers of government in the modern world. Direct liability is the 
logical extension of these trends. While uncommon to date, it appears 
both in coalescing federal systems like the EU, as well as established 
ones like Canada. In both cases, direct liability is a testament to the 
tension between local government’s freedom of action in federal 
systems and the international obligations that those local 
governments bear. 
*     *     * 
 
 177. By signing the treaty, other states recognize that the subnational government has 
legal personality for purposes of the treaty, thereby giving rise to responsibility. See Allan 
Rosas, The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU Member 
States, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1304, 1343–35 (2011). 
 178. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	10 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation	.	.	.	.”). 
 179. See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 749–
55, 759 (2010). The U.S. Constitution permits states to enter into “compact[s,]” but not 
treaties, so long as Congress provides its consent. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	10. 
 180. Gerald P. Heckman, International Human Rights Law Norms and Discretionary 
Powers: Recent Developments, 16 CANADIAN J. ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 31, 33 n.5 (2002) 
(“The federal executive may exercise its prerogative powers to enter into international 
treaties that bind Canada on the international plane	.	.	.	.”). 
 181. See Pierre Marc Johnson, Patrick Muzzi & Veronique Bastien, The Voice of 
Quebec in the CETA Negotiations, 68 INT’L J. 560, 561 (2013) (discussing Quebec’s 
participation in the international trade negotiations that led to CETA). 
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The conventional wisdom that nation-states do or should answer 
for the actions of their local governments is under stress. The rise of 
robust dispute resolution and compulsory jurisdiction in international 
economic law has brought a wave of claims against national 
governments based on local action. Nations have responded by 
creating exemptions for local action—exemptions that frequently 
benefit federal states more than non-federal states. The trend in 
international law has thus been away from the strict vicarious liability 
of national governments and towards immunity from claims based on 
local action. At the same time, however, a nascent system of direct 
liability has emerged as a possible rival to immunity. Below, each of 
these liability rules is evaluated, both from the standpoint of states as 
well as from the standpoint of general welfare. 
II.  EVALUATING LOCAL LIABILITY RULES 
In order to make sense of the trend towards immunity for local 
action, we first must have an idea of how well liability rules perform 
their underlying function. This Part evaluates three liability rules in 
light of the two key purposes of liability: (1) providing incentives for 
governments to comply with the law (litigation’s regulatory function) 
and (2) ensuring the availability of relief to a successful claimant 
(litigation’s compensatory function). Direct liability provides better 
incentives for compliance than vicarious liability, although vicarious 
liability may provide greater relief for claimants. However, in a 
vacuum, direct liability is superior to vicarious liability because better 
regulation of conduct will reduce the need for compensation. 
Immunity performs the worst of these three rules under both criteria. 
This result creates a puzzle: why are governments moving from a 
relatively effective liability rule to one that fails to achieve liability’s 
aim? Part III turns to that question. 
A. Incentivizing Compliance 
From an economic point of view, efficient liability rules impose 
the total costs (and benefits) of an action on the actor, whether or not 
the actor feels the effect directly.182 An actor that internalizes the 
costs and benefits of its actions in this way will act in a way that 
 
 182. See Allan M. Feldman & John M. Frost, A Simple Model of Efficient Tort Liability 
Rules, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 201, 212 (1998) (noting that standard efficient tort 
liability rules can be applied to situations with multiple defendants). 
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maximizes global welfare.183 In this way, liability serves a regulatory 
function: it creates prospective incentives for actors to behave in the 
interest of the general welfare. In domestic law, this internalization 
principle is familiar. Its logic is clearest when examining the theory of 
efficient breach of contract. There, the imposition of expectation 
damages ensures that the plaintiff is made whole for the harm she 
suffers as a result of the defendant’s conduct.184 Expectation damages 
should therefore cause a defendant to internalize the costs of its 
breach of contract. Knowing that it faces efficient expectation 
damages, the defendant will only breach the contract if the gains it 
privately captures exceed the costs its actions create for potential 
plaintiffs.185 
Two variables affect a liability rule’s ability to incentivize 
government compliance: (1) whether the liability rule leads to the 
actual violating party paying the costs of its action and (2) the 
likelihood that a claimant will bring a challenge. As explained below, 
direct liability forces the acting government to internalize the costs of 
its actions. On the other hand, vicarious liability and immunity both 
allow the acting government to externalize its costs. Moreover, direct 
liability is unlikely to reduce the likelihood of investment claims, 
although it would marginally reduce the probability of claims 
challenging local action in trade law. 
 
 183. In the liability context, actors are typically expected to internalize the costs of 
their actions to avoid an oversupply of costly conduct. Legal rules should also, however, 
reward actors for benefits they create that they do not directly capture. Otherwise, actors 
undersupply the beneficial conduct. See Meyer, supra note 40, at 1987. 
 184. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract 
Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 694 (1986) (“A rule of expectation damages, for 
instance, completely insures the promisee against loss	.	.	.	.”). 
 185. Id. at 701. In other areas of the law, different damages rules are designed to 
accomplish the same purpose. Punitive damages, for example, can be understood as an 
effort to impose efficient damages on a tortfeasor that likely does not face liability for 
each individual tort committed. See generally A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell, 
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) (discussing the 
deterrence rationale for the imposition of punitive damages). If the tortfeasor commits ten 
torts that each cause $1,000 worth of harm but only one victim brings suit, an efficient 
damages award compensates the victim $1,000 and also awards punitive damages of at 
least $9,000 to guarantee that the tortfeasor does not profit from the tortious actions. 
Faced with an efficient damages award, the tortfeasor must take into account the social 
costs of those tortious actions. See id. In civil procedure, aggregate litigation performs this 
function. Class actions allow small claims to be brought in a single suit so that a defendant 
cannot escape liability simply because the harms it causes individual victims is too small to 
justify a lawsuit. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: 
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677–79 (outlining economic and social 
justifications for class action suits). 
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1.  Internalizing Costs 
Direct liability best fulfills the regulatory purpose of litigation. It 
forces the actor actually breaching an obligation to internalize the 
costs of its actions.186 The mechanism through which direct liability 
forces cost internalization differs between trade and investment law. 
In investment law, dispute resolution is between a private party on 
the one hand, and a state on the other.187 Moreover, an award in an 
investment dispute results in monetary damages that impose the costs 
of discrimination on the local government.188 
Trade law is more complicated. Trade disputes are between two 
states and do not result in financial penalties.189 Instead, under trade 
law a successful claimant suspends concessions.190 For example, a 
claimant might receive permission to raise tariffs on computers from 
the violating state above the level permitted by the relevant WTO 
Agreement (here, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) or 
the goods chapter of a free trade agreement such as the TPP.191 
These concessions, in turn, are made at the national level. 
California, for example, will not specifically receive concessions from 
Japan if and when the United States joins the TPP. In principle, this 
could make targeting the suspension of concessions at a local 
government, as direct liability would require, difficult. Japan could 
not raise tariffs on computers from California specifically, only on 
computers from the United States. Nevertheless, a trade agreement 
 
 186. Cf. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s 
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” 
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 37 (2003) (noting in the context of land use cases that the 
“fact that liability [under NAFTA] for violations of the agreements is imposed on the 
signatory state, rather than directly on its local governments or regulatory agencies, makes 
such internalization especially unlikely”). 
 187. See ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 25 (“The jurisdiction of the Centre 
shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State	.	.	.	and a national of another Contracting State	.	.	.	.”). 
 188. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 103, art. 24. 
 189. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 22, ¶	1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (“The WTO shall provide 
the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members 
in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the 
Annexes to this Agreement.”). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. (“If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent 
with a covered agreement into compliance[,]	.	.	.	any party having invoked the dispute 
settlement procedures may request authorization from the [Dispute Settlment Body] to 
suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations 
under the covered agreements.”). 
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could initially permit only the suspension of concessions that would 
predominantly affect the offending local government. 
Only if those concessions were inadequate would a foreign 
government be permitted to suspend concessions that affect the 
nation more broadly. This geographic approach to trade retaliation 
has precedent in current trade law. Under the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), suspended concessions should 
come from the same sector as that in which the violation occurred.192 
If the claimant believes limiting its suspending concessions in this 
fashion would be impractical or ineffective, it may look first to other 
sectors under the same agreement, and then to retaliation under other 
agreements (e.g., services or intellectual property), a concept known 
as cross-retaliation.193 
Faced with the costs of its action through these mechanisms, a 
local government should only take the action if the benefits it gets 
from breaching exceed the costs it imposes on others. Moreover, 
knowing in advance that they can be called to account for their 
actions, local governments will be more likely to educate themselves 
both about their legal responsibilities and about the costs of their 
actions on others outside their jurisdictions.194 Under vicarious 
liability, local governments are often rationally ignorant of 
international law. Lacking direct accountability under international 
law, many local governments have little reason to invest resources in 
learning what international law requires of them.195 Indeed, national 
governments sometimes step in to educate local governments about 
their responsibilities in the hopes of reducing violations.196 For 
example, following the Avena decision, the U.S. State Department 
undertook a campaign to educate local police forces about the Vienna 
 
 192. Id. at art. 22.3 (setting forth the rules on what concessions may be suspended). 
 193. Id. 
 194. International law increasingly requires nations to inform themselves of the cross-
border impacts of their actions. See Daniel Kazhdan, Note, Precautionary Pulp: Pulp Mills 
and the Evolving Dispute Between International Tribunals over the Reach of the 
Precautionary Principle, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 527, 547 (2011). The ICJ declared in the Pulp 
Mills case that a customary international law norm exists requiring countries to undertake 
an environmental impact assessment (“EIA”) when economic activity might have cross-
border effects. Id. The effectiveness of this emerging substantive norm, however, is limited 
by the fact that the international law of state responsibility provides that only the nation is 
liable for a breach of this norm. Local governments are thus not themselves directly 
incentivized by international law to comply with the substantive rules on performing cross-
border EIAs. 
 195. See Johanna Kalb, Dynamic Federalism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 
84 TUL. L. REV. 1025, 1036–37 (2010). 
 196. Id. at 1039. 
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Convention on Consular Relations’ (“VCCR”) requirements.197 
Direct liability would solve this problem by providing local 
governments with an incentive to proactively review their laws and 
regulations to ensure their compatibility with international law. 
Vicarious liability is second best from an internalization 
standpoint. Under vicarious liability, local governments externalize 
the costs of their actions onto national governments. Whether liability 
deters breaches thus depends on whether national liability 
incentivizes national governments to prospectively regulate unlawful 
local programs. For example, when the United States lost a WTO 
dispute about the legality of the U.S. State of Washington’s subsidies 
for Boeing, the State of Washington—the actual breaching party—
received no direct penalty.198 Instead, the federal government risked 
retaliation by the EU if it did not get Washington to come into 
compliance or if it did not otherwise reach agreement with the EU.199 
Consequently, U.S. states need not consider the costs of their actions 
on others because the vicarious liability imposes the loss on a 
different government, the United States. 
In principle, several existing methods impose liability on the local 
actor within a vicarious liability scheme. The first method is that the 
national governments may be able to impose the loss or liability on 
the subnational government. In the United States, however, no rule 
allows the federal government to recoup financial liability it incurs as 
a result of state or local government action, nor can it pass along the 
costs of defending the claim to the local government.200 The same is 
true in Canada.201 However, after Canada settled the AbitibiBowater 
NAFTA case for $130 million, in which Newfoundland and Labrador 
expropriated an American company’s water and timber rights, 
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated, 
 
 197. Id. (“[T]he executive branch has generally adopted a deferential posture towards 
the states’ VCCR enforcement efforts, limiting itself to educating state and local officials 
as to what the VCCR entails and to encouraging the states to comply with its 
mandates	.	.	.	.”). 
 198. See U.S.—Aircraft, supra note 24, ¶	1352. 
 199. See id. ¶¶	4–6 (outlining the EU’s arguments regarding the existence and effect of 
U.S. federal and state-level subsidies). 
 200. See David I. Spector, Note, Trade Treaty Threats and Sub-National Sovereignty: 
Multilateral Trade Treaties and Their Negligible Impact on State Laws, 27 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 367, 385–86, 395–96 (2004). 
 201. Lawrence L. Herman, Federalism and International Investment Disputes, INV. 
TREATY NEWS (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/federalism-and-
international-investment-disputes/ [https://perma.cc/5V6A-VSSC]. 
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[While] I do not intend to get back the monies expended in this 
case from the government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador[,]	.	.	.	I have indicated that in future, should provincial 
actions cause significant legal obligations for the government of 
Canada, the government of Canada will create a mechanism so 
that it can reclaim monies lost through international trade 
processes.202 
The European Commission’s proposal regarding the administration 
of EU investment law envisions a similar mechanism.203 Although the 
EU would have exclusive competence for investment law and 
investment disputes, member states could be responsible for defense 
costs and any resulting liability if the claim arose from their actions.204 
Second, in some situations, a claimant may be able to impose 
some of the loss directly on the subnational government even if it 
cannot sue the subnational government directly. For example, under 
WTO rules on retaliation, a party that is authorized to withdraw 
concessions in response to an ongoing violation has a great deal of 
discretion as to which concessions it withdraws.205 Consequently, a 
savvy foreign government can craft a package of concessions to 
withdraw that will principally hurt the relevant local government. 
Returning to the Boeing example, the EU won a judgment declaring 
that a package of subsidies for Boeing, including state and local 
subsidies in Washington, Kansas, and Illinois, violated WTO rules.206 
In 2012, the EU requested authorization to suspend concessions 
worth approximately $12 billion annually in response to an alleged 
failure by the United States to remove the unlawful subsidies.207 
Although the EU has not yet named the goods on which it might 
suspend concessions, it might consider withdrawing concessions on, 
for example, computer or technology products in order to hurt 
companies such as Microsoft and Amazon that are located in 
Washington. Such sanctions might be more effective at inducing local 
government compliance than would countermeasures targeting the 
United States generally. 
Third, national governments can engage with local governments 
to induce them to change their unlawful measures, even if they cannot 
 
 202. Marotte & Ibbitson, supra note 77. 
 203. See Comprehensive European Investment Policy, supra note 168, at 10. 
 204. Id.  
 205. See DSU, supra note 189, art. 22.3. 
 206. U.S.—Aircraft, supra note 24, ¶¶	479, 1350. 
 207. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
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compel them to do so directly. In Canada-Renewable Energy,208 the 
WTO DSB found that Ontario’s local content requirements in its 
renewable energy feed-in tariff unlawfully discriminated against 
foreign products.209 The Canadian government prevailed upon the 
Ontario government to remove most of its local preferences, but 
Canada was forced to confess to the WTO that it had failed to get 
Ontario to remove all of them.210 In other cases, governments may be 
able to more directly influence or even preempt local action. 
Finally, vicarious liability can also incentivize governments to 
nationalize actions with international effects in order to avoid 
liability. The federal government might, for example, preempt the 
local law, as the United States has the authority to do when U.S. state 
laws conflict with WTO rules.211 Preemption has significant 
limitations, however. In federal systems, national governments may 
lack the ability to direct subnational governments to change their 
behavior. For example, if the federal government is one of limited 
and enumerated powers, as the United States government is, the 
federal government may not be able to direct subordinate 
governments to act on matters outside of those enumerated areas. 
The “federalism” reservations that have been attached to the UN 
Convention Against Corruption or the heretofore unsuccessful efforts 
to ratify the UN Disabilities Convention is predicated on the view 
that the U.S. federal government’s supervisory powers are indeed 
limited.212 
 
 208. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, ¶	6, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013); 
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, ¶	6, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS4426/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013). 
 209. Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, supra note 208, ¶	6.  
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& Beauvais, supra note 186, at 135–36 (noting that the federal government could preempt 
local land use regulations that violate NAFTA). 
 212. See S. REP. NO. 109-4, §	2(1), at 6–7 (2005) (“The United States of America 
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its fundamental principles of federalism	.	.	.	.”); see also Thomas D. Grant, The U.N. 
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Even when nations have the legal power to regulate their states 
or provinces, the political costs in countries with a strong tradition of 
federalism may prohibit such regulation. Several examples illustrate 
the point. In the United States, federal preemption of state laws that 
are concededly unlawful under international law is highly 
controversial. Following the Avena judgment, legislation requiring 
state-level compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations could not get through Congress.213 Similarly, the federal 
government has not taken action to preempt state subsidies for 
Boeing even though such subsidies have created international 
responsibility under the WTO agreements.214 Indeed, foreign nations 
insist that Quebec participate directly in negotiations, knowing that 
Canada itself often cannot compel Quebec’s compliance.215 In the 
negotiations between the EU and Canada on the CETA, for example, 
Quebec participated through its own delegation that it maintains in 
Brussels and the appointment of its own chief negotiator.216 More 
prosaically, national governments are not staffed to review all 
legislation or administrative regulations coming from local 
governments. National governments, even in developed countries, 
may therefore have limited capacity to prospectively avoid liability 
through preemption. 
These possible methods of influence mean that vicarious liability 
does create some incentives to avoid local violations of international 
law. These incentives will vary by country. In countries in which 
national governments have more influence over local policy, these 
techniques may be relatively more effective. In systems with strong 
local government, on the other hand, the incentives for local 
governments to worry about violating international law will be fairly 
minor. 
Immunity completely fails to incentivize governments to consider 
the social costs of their actions. If neither the local nor the national 
government faces potential liability for an action, then the self-
interested reasons to avoid violations of international law are 
minimal. National governments have reputational considerations that 
may push them to comply with international law for self-interested 
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reasons, even in the absence of liability.217 Local governments, 
however, likely do not have reputations for compliance with 
international law that matter to them, making the complete absence 
of liability even more troubling from a compliance perspective.218 
In the immunity context, therefore, the relevant actor does not 
even have the weak incentives it has in the vicarious liability context 
to consider the social costs of its actions. To give but one example, the 
TPP’s immunity rule does not provide either the United States or 
California, which on its own would be the sixth largest national 
economy in the world,219 with an incentive to ensure that their existing 
environmental regulations are nondiscriminatory.220 Instead of 
providing an incentive to take precaution, immunity rules operate, in 
a sense, as a subsidy for government action. Rather than having to 
pay liability out of the public fisc, the loss borne by government actors 
is absorbed directly by the victims. In effect, immunity rules create a 
concentrated loss for the victim rather than a distributed loss among 
the polity. 
2.  The Likelihood of Claims 
While direct liability may cause a violator to internalize the 
consequences of its action, the respondent must first be held in 
violation. Such a holding, in turn, requires that claimants be willing to 
bring claims. Of the three liability rules, immunity of course creates 
the lowest probability of claims—zero. Direct liability and vicarious 
liability create similar claims in investment law, although vicarious 
liability will produce more claims in trade law. This difference, as 
explained below, results from the different structure of dispute 
resolution in trade and investment. 
Direct liability is intuitively appealing because it places the 
burden most squarely on the party actually in breach. However, 
international disputes are expensive to litigate. A claim must be 
sufficiently valuable before it becomes worthwhile for a challenger to 
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bring a claim. Any individual local government might face such a low 
threat of litigation that direct liability would provide it relatively little 
incentive to improve its efforts to comply with international norms. 
The U.S. State of Maine or the Australian province of Western 
Australia, both of which contain only small percentages of their 
nation’s populations, might not present significant enough targets to 
justify a claim. They therefore might escape review under a direct 
liability scheme. With this in mind, the case for direct liability is less 
obvious. 
Consider, for example, renewable energy subsidies that require 
the energy producer to purchase its equipment locally. International 
tribunals have held these local content requirements to violate trade 
and investment rules.221 Moreover, India has identified a number of 
these programs in U.S. cities such as Austin, Texas, and Los Angeles, 
California.222 But the effect of Austin’s discrimination is seemingly 
not large enough to justify the political, diplomatic, and financial costs 
of bring a WTO claim against the United States. India has therefore 
complained about the local programs in the United States,223 but to 
date has foregone a formal complaint within the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system. 
By contrast, vicarious liability may make challenging local 
programs more viable. Vicarious liability acts as a kind of class-action 
vehicle in which a series of local claims can be brought as a single 
claim against the national government. Claimants can thus take 
advantage of economies of scale under vicarious liability that are lost 
under direct liability. Because of this, vicarious liability might lead to 
more litigation than direct liability, even if the litigation that does 
occur is less effective at inducing change than hypothetical litigation 
against a local government. In United States-Gambling, for example, 
Antigua and Barbuda challenged a set of U.S. federal measures that 
restricted the provision of remote (i.e., online) cross-border gambling 
services.224 Along with the federal measures, Antigua and Barbuda 
challenged state measures in all fifty of the U.S. states.225 Antigua 
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would likely not have challenged all these state programs had it been 
forced to do so individually. Similarly, a claimant may challenge a 
local measure to establish the unlawfulness of a particular kind of 
regulatory action practiced throughout a country. Under vicarious 
liability, establishing a precedent based on a local program can have 
liberalizing effects throughout the country by forcing the country to 
review similar programs. 
In investment law, these concerns about scale are not likely to 
depress the number of claims significantly. Investment agreements 
such as chapter 9 of the TPP or chapter 11 of NAFTA allow private 
investors to bring claims.226 The viability of investment claims is 
subject to a different calculus than trade claims, which must be 
brought by a government. A private investor should be willing to 
bring any claim that has positive economic value. Investors have thus 
challenged even relatively small-scale programs, such as the 
regulation of funeral homes in Mississippi227 or efforts to build a new, 
publicly owned bridge between Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, 
Ontario.228 
On the other hand, these considerations about economies of 
scale would likely result in fewer trade claims under direct liability. In 
trade cases, remedies do not take the form of monetary damages that 
can fund litigation efforts.229 Whereas a private citizen could monetize 
the possibility of a cash award to pay the costs of litigation (such as 
through a contingency fee arrangement), governments cannot. 
Governments may therefore face capacity constraints that prevent 
them from even bringing cases with positive economic value, forcing 
them to focus on claims with higher expected payoffs.230 Moreover, a 
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state may decline to bring a good trade case for diplomatic or political 
reasons that would not affect a private investor’s decision. 
Even within trade law, though, one would expect these effects to 
be moderated by the trade repercussions of local violations. On the 
one hand, measures in particularly large subnational governments 
that create large trade effects seem just as likely to be targeted under 
direct liability as under vicarious liability. Regional governments like 
California, New York, or Ontario would therefore face a similar risk 
of claims under either direct or vicarious liability. At the other end of 
the spectrum, under either regime many small, local violations will go 
unchallenged, as they do under the current vicarious liability regime. 
Under any liability rule, small programs that create only small 
discriminatory effects may not be worth challenging. These measures 
are thus unaffected by the choice of a liability rule. Again, India and 
China have both identified a series of state- and city-level renewable 
energy support measures in the United States that they believe 
violate WTO rules.231 Yet neither has formally pushed for the 
establishment of a WTO panel to consider these measures, possibly 
because none of the measures are sufficiently restrictive, given their 
small geographic scope. 
B. The Availability of Relief 
Liability rules can also be assessed based on the extent to which 
they provide relief to a successful claimant. Dispute resolution is, 
after all, not only about providing prospective incentives for 
respondents to regulate their conduct. It also should provide 
compensation to victims of breaches that have occurred. 
Here, vicarious liability has an edge over direct liability, while 
immunity once again performs the worst among all three rules. 
Immunity, of course, fails to offer any relief to a claimant. Thus, a 
claimant’s ability to get relief depends on what level of government 
behaved in a discriminatory fashion. If a local government is the 
culprit, relief also depends on whether the discriminatory act in 
question can be related to a discriminatory act that existed at the time 
the economic treaty came into force. If those two conditions are met, 
immunity affords claimants no relief. 
Vicarious liability may provide better relief than direct liability in 
at least two ways. First, in investment arbitrations in which the 
remedies are monetary awards, national governments may have 
deeper pockets than local governments. Indeed, local governments 
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may be judgment proof in the same way that individual defendants in 
civil suits may be.232 Moreover, enforcing an award against a national 
government will be easier, all else equal, because enforcing an 
arbitration award that a government (or its courts) refuses to honor 
requires attaching assets in a foreign country pursuant to a treaty 
regime such as the New York Convention.233 For example, successful 
foreign investors have sought to attach Argentinian government 
assets abroad to satisfy their awards.234 Local governments, though, 
are less likely to have assets located outside of their own borders. As 
a result, enforcement of monetary awards against a local government 
may be more difficult if courts in the local government’s jurisdiction 
refuse enforcement. Direct liability may increase the likelihood that a 
defendant can avoid paying an award, leaving the successful claimant 
with only a hollow victory. 
The fact that direct liability tends to be joint and several under 
international law does somewhat reduce the risk of hollow victories. 
National governments remain responsible for local governments. 
Thus, if a local government cannot satisfy an award against it, the 
national government remains on the hook. In at least some 
circumstances, however, jurisdiction may not exist over the national 
government. For example, in Cable Television,235 the Nevis Island 
Administration—a local subdivision of the St. Kitts national 
government—agreed to arbitrate disputes with Cable Television.236 
An investment tribunal found, however, that the St. Kitts national 
government had not consented to claims against the local 
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government; in other words, St. Kitts had not consented to direct 
liability for its localities.237 Moreover, St. Kitts itself had not agreed to 
arbitrate disputes with Cable Television.238 Thus, while St. Kitts would 
have been responsible for the local government’s violation, 
jurisdiction prevented effective liability.239 In similar situations, the 
risk of an unenforceable award is real. 
Second, in trade disputes, foreign governments may have an 
easier time retaliating in a way that hurts national governments.240 
Under WTO law, if a government does not bring itself into 
compliance with a recommendation of the DSB the successful 
complainant can get permission to suspend concessions.241 It can, for 
example, raise tariffs above the level permitted by its WTO 
commitments. As discussed above, governments have wide discretion 
in choosing which concessions to suspend.242 They will choose which 
concessions to withdraw with an eye toward increasing the political 
pressure on the violating government to bring itself into compliance. 
For example, in 2002, President Bush imposed safeguards on steel 
imports that were designed to curry favor with voters in Midwestern 
states that feared the loss of manufacturing jobs.243 The WTO DSB 
found the safeguards unlawful.244 After President Bush indicated he 
intended to leave the safeguards in place notwithstanding the DSB’s 
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judgment, the EU threatened to impose tariffs on Florida oranges and 
Michigan automobiles, among other products.245 The EU chose these 
specific products to hurt the Bush administration and the Republican 
Party in key electoral states.246 Its calculus was successful, as President 
Bush lifted the safeguards shortly thereafter.247 
Such mechanisms might not work as well against local 
governments, however. Local jurisdictions may have smaller or less 
diversified economies. In principle, the effect of a smaller, less 
diversified economy can cut either way. In some instances, the result 
could be that local governments are more vulnerable than they might 
otherwise be. If the complaining foreign government is a primary 
market for the local jurisdiction’s goods, for example, the local 
government may come into compliance faster than a national 
government that is diversified. A locality with an economy heavily 
dependent on agriculture, for example, might quickly remove a 
discriminatory measure if a major market like the EU raised tariffs on 
one of its staple products. The consequences of the foreign 
government’s countermeasures are magnified, in effect, by the small 
or undiversified nature of the local economy. 
On the other hand, in many other cases the foreign government 
may have no economic leverage over the local government. The 
discriminating local jurisdiction might not export products (or 
services) to the complaining foreign country, for example. Or even if 
it does, the discriminatory measure might protect one of the major 
producers in the local jurisdiction. Finally, in some instances the 
complaining nation might need the violator’s exports more than the 
violator needs the particular market. For example, oil-exporting 
nations have never been targeted in the WTO even though many 
nations claim that countries like Saudi Arabia violate WTO rules in 
restricting the production and export of oil.248 In any of these 
situations, identifying countermeasures that pressure the local 
government into changing its behavior may be more difficult than 
identifying such countermeasures for the national government. For 
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both of these reasons, the availability of relief—with its associated 
incentives to change one’s behavior in response to an adverse 
judgment—suggests that vicarious liability may be the superior rule. 
*     *     * 
Immunity, as this discussion makes clear, does a poor job of 
fulfilling the goals of a liability rule. It provides governments with no 
incentive to prospectively regulate their conduct and no relief for 
aggrieved claimants. Vicarious liability versus direct liability is a 
closer call, but ultimately direct liability is the better rule. As 
currently conceived, direct liability does a better job of providing 
incentives for local governments to consider the costs of their actions 
on others. It also provides an equal incentive to bring claims in 
investment law, although it may lead to fewer claims in trade law. 
Strict vicarious liability, however, likely provides more effective relief 
to the successful claimant and may do as well at encouraging 
monitoring. As explained in Part V, a system of joint and several 
liability could capture the benefits of both direct and strict vicarious 
liability. 
III.  VICARIOUS LIABILITY LEADS TO IMMUNITY 
Before turning to what a more robust direct liability regime 
might look like, however, this Article turns to unlocking a puzzle. If 
direct liability is the best liability rule and immunity the worst, why 
are states moving towards immunity? Vicarious liability is a long-
standing rule embraced by all states as recently as the founding of the 
WTO and NAFTA twenty years ago. Moreover, many states are 
centralized, making it unclear why they would agree to immunity 
rules that largely benefit federal states. 
This Part shows that national governments increasingly eliminate 
vicarious liability for local government action because (1) of 
disparities in bargaining power among federal and non-federal 
nations and (2) the structure of remedies in international economic 
law—especially investment law—which pushes national governments 
to emphasize their role as potential respondents over their role as 
potential claimants. Section A discusses the general conditions under 
which states will negotiate for immunity rather than vicarious liability, 
the default rule. Sections B and C analyze how states will negotiate in 
two bargaining situations: negotiations between states that are both 
either centralized or decentralized, and negotiations between a 
centralized state and a decentralized state. Section D concludes that 
decentralized states will drive the empirical trend towards immunity 
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due to the economic importance of federal countries in the world 
today. 
A. Immunity and Vicarious Liability from a State’s Point of View 
Consider the following illustration: Under the international law 
of state responsibility, vicarious liability is only a default rule.249 
Under the default rule, liability for local action is reciprocal. State A 
receives some positive benefits from being able to challenge local 
action in State B. The ability of State B to challenge State A’s local 
action is, however, costly to State A. We can thus think of a state’s 
utility from the status quo under vicarious liability as 
Ui
SL	=	Xi	–	Yi 
where Xi equals the ith state’s utility from being able to target local 
action in another state, and Yi equals the costs created by 
responsibility for one’s own local governments. X, in other words, is 
the expected value one gets as a potential claimant under vicarious 
liability. Y equals the expected costs one faces as a respondent under 
vicarious liability. 
Y can also be thought of, in part, as a function of the 
centralization of a country. Decentralized countries will have high 
values of Y, while centralized countries will have lower values of Y. 
To see why this is so, consider that a state subject to international 
economic law will take precautions to avoid liability up until the point 
at which the precautions are costlier than the benefits they create. 
These precautions—essentially forcing local governments to bring 
their measures into conformity with international rules—create both 
costs and benefits for the national government. This Article shall 
refer to these precautions as “liberalizing” because they typically 
involve removing barriers to trade and investment. Liberalization is 
beneficial to a national government for two reasons. First, it reduces 
its exposure to foreign claims. Second, it benefits domestic consumers 
by giving them access to the best available prices on international 
markets. 
At the same time, liberalization creates two sets of costs. First, 
domestic producers prefer protectionism to liberalization.250 They will 
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therefore put pressure on their governments to refuse to liberalize.251 
Second, overriding local governments can be costly in both legal and 
political terms. For example, in a federal state such as the United 
States, the federal government might pass a law automatically 
preempting any local law that an international tribunal found 
inconsistent with international law. Or a national government might 
preempt state laws in areas that are particularly likely to raise 
discrimination concerns, such as environmental and health 
regulations. Such actions, however, would surely be challenged in the 
courts as inconsistent with the federal constitutional structure of the 
United States.252 Moreover, even if such actions are constitutional, 
they are politically tenuous in a country that prides itself on strong 
local government.253 In more centralized states, such as China, this 
second set of costs will be lower. Such countries have fewer legal and 
political barriers to national preemption of local action. Indeed, in 
some centralized countries, especially small ones, all meaningful 
power may be centralized in the national government. 
Under vicarious liability, states will liberalize up until the point 
at which the marginal costs of liberalization exceed the marginal 
benefits in terms of reduced liability and political benefits from 
consumers. In principle, states perform the same calculus at the 
national level, liberalizing up until the point that the costs of 
liberalization exceed its benefits. The difference, however, is that 
liberalizing at the local level may be costlier in some states than 
liberalizing at the national level. States with high costs of liberalizing 
at the local level (decentralized states) will liberalize more at the 
national than the local level. States with low costs to eliminating non-
conforming local programs (centralized states) may not have to 
distinguish their liberalization efforts based on the level of 
government. Thus, high costs to liberalizing leads to a high Y, while, 
all else equal, low costs to liberalizing local programs will produce a 
lower Y. 
Now consider immunity. Under immunity, states cannot bring 
claims. Thus, their expected claims and expected liability are both 
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zero. However, because immunity is not the default rule, states must 
agree to change from vicarious liability to immunity. A state’s utility 
under immunity thus depends on the costs and benefits of agreeing on 
immunity. A state will only agree to change the liability rule to 
immunity if the marginal benefits of immunity are greater than or 
equal to the marginal costs (Ui
Immunity	>	UiSL). Let C equal the value of 
a concession offered to shift from vicarious liability to immunity. If 
accepted, a state’s utility from immunity is 
Ui
Immunity	=	Ci 
where Ci is positive if a state accepts a concession to agree to 
immunity and negative if it must offer a concession. Therefore, state i 
will only offer or accept a concession in exchange for changing the 
rule if 
Ci	≥	Xi	–	Yi	. 
Moreover, this equation must be true for all states that must consent 
to the change in liability. In other words, there must be some 
concession that at least one state can make that makes it better off 
than it would be under vicarious liability (because the concession is 
less costly than its net expected liability under vicarious liability) and 
that compensates those states that have positive expected utility 
under vicarious liability. 
A simple numeric example illustrates the point. Imagine that the 
United States obtains utility of 5 (XUS) from being able to challenge 
discriminatory local acts in South Korea but faces expected liability of 
10 (YUS) from South Korea or South Korean investors challenging 
local acts in the United States. Plugging these values into the equation 
above, the United States would be willing to make a concession worth 
up to 5 (CUS	≥	–5 because the United States is making the concession) 
in order to induce South Korea to agree to immunity. 
Imagine that for its part, South Korea obtains 4	(XSK) from being 
able to challenge local acts in the United States and suffers only 
1	(YSK) in terms of expected claims because it is a relatively 
centralized state. Under strict vicarious liability, South Korea’s utility 
is therefore equal to 3. South Korea, however, would be willing to 
agree to immunity so long as the United States makes a concession 
worth at least 3 (CSK	≥	4	–	1). As the United States would pay up to 5 
to avoid vicarious liability, the two states can agree to change the 
default rule. By contrast, if XSK	=	7, no agreement is possible. Then, 
CSK	≥	7	–	1. Since the United States cannot justify compensating 
South Korea more than 5, vicarious liability will remain in place. 
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B. Bargaining Among Similar States and the Unintended 
Consequences of Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
How realistically likely is it that states will bargain around the 
default rule? Consider the four basic bargaining scenarios that may 
arise. In the first situation, two centralized states negotiate an 
economic agreement. This situation is fairly straightforward. The 
parties here have similar incentives as both claimants and 
respondents. Moreover, neither expects to incur significant liability as 
a result of local action (Y approaches zero). Because local 
governments in centralized states retain little independent authority, 
centralized states can liberalize local measures at costs similar to 
those they incur liberalizing national measures. They will therefore 
see little need to change the default vicarious liability rule. 
In the second situation, two decentralized nations negotiate an 
agreement. Each decentralized government expects to be targeted as 
a respondent based on local action (each has a high value of Y). 
Significant local lawmaking powers, coupled with high costs to 
overriding local governments, means that both states face high 
expected liability from local action. A state’s utility from vicarious 
liability depends, of course, both on its own expected liability as well 
as its own expected gains from its role as a potential claimant (that is, 
it depends also on the value of X). Two decentralized states thus 
might reasonably agree to maintain vicarious liability so long as both 
states face high expected claims. One state’s liability is another state’s 
gain.254 As it turns out, however, decentralized nations are likely to 
increase their use of immunity over time, especially in the investment 
context,255 thus insulating a growing portion of regulation from 
international review. They may also do so in the trade context where, 
as in the case of trade in services, regulation is highly local and 
protectionist. 
To see why, consider the differing structure of dispute resolution 
in investment and trade. In investment law, remedies are typically 
monetary awards, but private parties, rather than national 
governments, bring claims.256 As a consequence, national 
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governments have high expected liability under investment law 
because they are the respondents faced with the prospect of financial 
liability. Moreover, private parties might be expected to bring more 
claims than governments because diplomacy and politics do not deter 
claims. By definition, decentralized states also have little ability to 
reduce their liability for local government acts. Finally, since private 
parties bring claims, states are not themselves claimants in investment 
law. They therefore do not capture significant value from their role as 
claimants. The result is that decentralized states overwhelmingly face 
negative utility from claims challenging local acts in investment law. 
They pay all the costs of being a respondent, have little ability to 
avoid or reduce those costs, and do not benefit reciprocally from 
direct role as a claimant (X	<	Y). 
To be sure, businesses that expected to be claimants under 
investment regimes—for example, companies in the extractive 
sector—provide political support for investor-state dispute resolution, 
meaning that national governments do capture some political support 
from their nationals’ role as claimants. But they do not capture the 
gains directly, even though they experience the losses—both financial 
and political—directly. X is therefore smaller than Y for both 
countries under an investment regime. Consequently, moving from 
vicarious liability to immunity makes both parties better off. Little is 
necessary in the way of concessions from one side to the other (C can 
be small or zero). 
This fact exposes an unintended consequence of the investment 
law regime. By privatizing claims, states created a mechanism that 
weakens their long-term commitment to investor-state dispute 
resolution in areas in which avoiding liability is costly ex ante. When 
they are unable to take precautions to reduce liability—as 
decentralized nations are unable to do in the investment context—
they will immunize themselves from liability altogether. In other 
words, ISDS is politically unstable under a vicarious liability regime 
because over time its structure encourages national governments to 
adopt a defense counsel mentality. 
The evidence of this instability is pervasive. The growing use of 
immunity provisions257 provides some evidence. But increasingly loud 
attacks on ISDS sound in the same tones. Politicians like Senator 
Elizabeth Warren,258 and officials in Australia,259 Germany,260 
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France,261 and the European Parliament262 openly wonder what their 
governments get out of allowing private parties to influence 
government policies through international arbitration. The fact that 
their own nationals can bring investment claims to influence policies 
in other countries counts little to them. Multinational enterprises—
the kinds of companies most likely to use ISDS—do not necessarily 
have policy interests aligned with their own governments.263 
The situation in trade is different. There, national governments 
are both claimants and respondents. The expected gains from being a 
claimant are thus much more likely to equate to the expected losses 
as a respondent. Governments can bring claims in order to gain 
political support from domestic exporters and consumers, and they 
face political costs from anti-import interests in their role as 
respondents. Given the gains from long-term liberalization that 
governments believe accrue from trade, it is more likely that the 
utility from vicarious liability is positive for both countries (X	>	Y, 
and therefore USL	>	0). 
Interestingly, governments appear to have settled on vicarious 
liability for trade in goods but immunity for existing discriminatory 
measures in trade in services.264 This fact suggests that expected gains 
as a claimant exceed expected losses as a respondent in goods but not 
services, despite the reciprocal nature of dispute resolution. One 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is the strongly local and 
often protectionist nature of laws governing the provision of services, 
such as licensing rules in federal countries like the United States. As 
Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw Allensworth observe, professional 
licensing is done primarily at the state level in the United States.265 
Moreover, professional licensing is both deeply protectionist, raising 
antitrust concerns domestically, and so politically entrenched that 
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national regulation has proved elusive.266 Together, these factors may 
mean that federal states face higher expected liability for local action 
than expected gains. In the trade in goods context, by contrast, border 
measures such as tariffs—which are under the control of the national 
government—are relatively more important in determining the ease 
with which foreigners can access markets. Liberalizing to avoid 
liability thus does not tread on politically important local 
protectionism to the same degree. 
C. Bargaining Among Decentralized and Centralized Nations 
Two other bargaining situations involve a mix of centralized and 
decentralized states. In the third situation, a powerful decentralized 
state negotiates with a weaker centralized nation. In this situation, we 
can again expect states to alter the default rule in favor of immunity, 
all else equal. The powerful decentralized nation, such as the United 
States, stands to lose under the default rule because it becomes liable 
for the actions of its local governments but is not easily able to avoid 
that liability by liberalizing local acts (Y is high). At the same time, 
the other nation is centralized, meaning that local powers are weak 
and easily overridden by the center should it wish to avoid 
international liability. Therefore, the decentralized nation receives 
little from vicarious liability (X is low). 
The reverse is true for the centralized nation, which has high 
expected value as a claimant and low expected liability. In other 
words, the vicarious liability rule favors the centralized state. In this 
situation, a concession will be necessary to induce the weak state to 
agree to immunity. The question is thus whether there is a concession 
that makes both states better off. Will the decentralized state be able 
to offer something that costs less than its expected liability but 
compensates the centralized state for its foregone liability? 
The structure of remedies in trade and investment law once again 
makes this result more likely. From the standpoint of the two 
governments involved, liability in any given case is likely negative-
sum,267 meaning the state that loses the case (likely the decentralized 
state) loses more than the state on the prevailing side. As explained 
above, this result occurs in investment cases because the claimant is 
not actually the state in question. One state thus loses and the other 
state receives only diffuse political benefits from having established 
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the system that allows its investors to bring claims. In trade cases, this 
result is less obvious because states are on both sides. However, 
because remedies in trade are only prospective, they do not make the 
complaining party whole.268 They are thus costly to the respondent 
and fail to completely compensate the complainant. For this reason, 
states may eliminate jurisdiction ex ante over those trade claims that 
are especially difficult for the complainant to comply with. Doing so 
creates a net gain for the parties by eliminating the unavoidable losses 
that come from local programs that decentralized states cannot easily 
liberalize. 
The fact that removing liability for local acts creates gains for the 
parties combined does not tell us what the parties will trade to agree 
on immunity. After all, the centralized state loses from immunity 
while the decentralized state wins. The decentralized state must 
therefore offer some of its gains to the centralized state. 
Game theory predicts here that the parties will agree to a 
relatively small concession in exchange for immunity for local 
claims.269 The intuition behind this prediction flows from the notion of 
opportunity costs. To take a concrete example, consider negotiations 
between the United States and Uruguay on a BIT. The opportunity 
cost of failing to reach an agreement in February differs greatly for 
the two states. For the United States, Uruguay is just one relatively 
small market among many. If the two countries cannot agree until 
June or February of the following year, the United States has lost 
little. For Uruguay, the stakes are higher. The United States has the 
fourth largest stock of foreign investment in Uruguay.270 Failure to 
reach agreement thus risks costing Uruguay a significant portion of its 
foreign investment. In bargaining, the United States is thus able to 
wait out Uruguay, using the greater benefit to Uruguay as part of the 
concession to induce Uruguay to agree to immunity.271 In a 
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multilateral context, such as the TPP negotiations, the invitation to 
participate in the negotiations at all might be part of the concession. 
Countries can, after all, join the TPP after it is complete, provided 
that current members agree.272 When doing so, they have little ability 
to alter its rules, a situation in which South Korea now finds itself.273 
In other words, by controlling the terms of participation, a 
country like the United States can avoid having to make significant 
concessions on the substantive rules contained in the agreement. The 
powerful state has the ability to effectively exclude the less powerful 
state from a trade agreement, either through delay or outright 
exclusion. The weaker state’s choice, in effect, is no agreement today 
or agreement today with immunity for local provisions. If market 
access is important to the weaker state, it will prefer to agree today, 
even on terms that it finds suboptimal. 
The fourth situation involves a powerful centralized state and a 
weaker decentralized state. The analysis of winners and losers is the 
same as in the third situation: a move to immunity favors the 
decentralized state, while retaining vicarious liability favors the 
centralized state. Here, though, the power disparities suggest that the 
centralized state will be difficult to move off of its preferred rule. Of 
course, international negotiations are complicated. Powerful states 
may be willing to give up their preferred liability rule if sufficient 
offsetting concessions are put on the table. But the logic of 
opportunity costs discussed above cuts the other way in these 
situations. Now the weaker decentralized state is pressured to agree 
to future liability for local measures (i.e., retaining vicarious liability) 
in order to induce agreement. Consequently, it is expected that 
vicarious liability would remain in more situations. The weaker state 
simply cannot come up with a big enough concession to compensate 
the more powerful state. 
Chinese economic treaties provide the clearest example of this 
dynamic. As discussed in Section I.B, China includes a provision in its 
agreements exempting all of its existing non-conforming measures, 
not only local ones.274 It includes such a provision even in agreements 
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with federal states such as Australia that only request exemption for 
their regional and local measures.275 Access to the Chinese market on 
preferential terms is valuable to states such as Australia and Canada, 
and certainly to smaller economies with whom China enters into 
agreements. China is thus able to extract much broader immunity as 
the price of any local immunity in federal states. 
D. Empirical Trends 
These bargaining dynamics suggest that, in theory, we should see 
immunity in some situations but vicarious liability in others. 
Empirically, however, good reasons exist to think that immunity will 
continue to replace vicarious liability if another approach is not 
identified. First, many of the most important economies in the world 
are federal: Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, India, 
Mexico, Russia, and the United States, to name only a handful. If just 
these countries began uniformly immunizing existing local measures 
from discrimination challenges in their future agreements, a wide 
range of regulatory activity will escape international review. 
Second, the number and importance of these countries to the 
global economy suggests that powerful decentralized states 
negotiating with weaker centralized states—a situation that produces 
immunity—will occur more frequently than the reverse situation. For 
the same reason, negotiations among federal countries also capture a 
much greater share of the global economy than negotiations among 
centralized countries. NAFTA, for example, is an agreement entirely 
among federal countries, and four of the five largest economies in the 
TPP are federal countries (Australia, Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States).276 
Finally, China is perhaps the largest centralized economy that 
could push back against immunity. Instead, however, it appears that 
China is willing to accept local immunity in exchange for 
comprehensive immunity for its own existing discriminatory 
measures.277 Far from pushing back on immunity, China is expanding 
the trend.278 This bargaining dynamic suggests a significant limitation 
on the liberalizing effects of potential future trade agreements 
between China and the United States or the EU. Permanently 
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grandfathering existing discriminatory programs in China is a high 
price to pay for protecting local governments. 
More generally, observers should be greatly concerned that the 
immunity provisions in current economic treaties will expand. At 
present, they apply only to existing discriminatory measures and any 
renewal, amendment, or modification thereof. The prominence of 
federal economies in the world, combined with China’s position on 
grandfathering, suggests that broader immunity provisions could 
easily be the way of the future. Such provisions might, for example, 
immunize all local measures, existing or future. The immunity 
provisions might also expand beyond the nondiscrimination rules, 
providing protection for challenges based on investment law on fair 
and equitable treatment, for example. The TPP’s provision granting 
immunity from any claims challenging tobacco control measures 
suggests that the possibility of broader immunity is not far-fetched.279 
IV.  IMMUNITY’S THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
Governments and policymakers thus find themselves in a 
difficult position. Vicarious liability and direct liability each have 
benefits, but governments increasingly replace vicarious liability with 
immunity. Moreover, this trend is accelerating and could threaten to 
undermine the liberalizing effects of international economic 
agreements. Dani Rodrik, a highly regarded Harvard trade 
economist, has noted that economic models showing that the TPP will 
increase real incomes in member states depend on assumptions that 
may be unrealistic.280 The gains from the TPP depend on reducing 
non-tariff barriers and loosening restrictions on foreign investment, 
including by eliminating discrimination.281 The findings of this Article 
further underscore Rodrik’s concerns. By insulating large swaths of 
discrimination from challenge, the TPP and agreements like it reduce 
the economic benefits of the agreement. Yet economic predictions 
fail to catch this significant limitation. 
This Part provides the missing piece of the analysis, arguing that 
immunity has dire consequences for international economic law for 
three reasons. First, immunity reduces the general welfare of the 
populations in both countries. Second, it has distributional effects that 
threaten the legitimacy of the international economic system. 
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Specifically, immunity further skews the gains from international 
economic law toward large economies that tend to be relatively 
decentralized. Third, immunity for local action insulates localities 
right at the time that local governments are playing an increasingly 
important role in international governance. 
A. Welfare Effects of Local Immunity 
In general, local immunity reduces the economic gains both 
countries might otherwise expect from an agreement such as the TPP. 
Given the strong debate among economists about the overall effect of 
the TPP on welfare,282 this finding is significant. 
The basic theory underlying trade liberalization explains these 
foregone gains. Discriminating against foreign products or services 
raises the cost of those foreign products or services in the domestic 
market. For example, if foreign service providers must pay additional 
costs to become licensed to provide a service in the United States, 
they will have to charge more for their services, or may not be able to 
provide them at all. Domestic consumers thus lose out because they 
pay prices for goods that are inflated by the government’s 
discrimination. Foreign producers lose out because they lose market 
share. On the other hand, domestic producers that sell in the domestic 
market gain market share because they do not have to compete on 
price. These domestic producers, in turn, confer political benefits on 
the government that protects them. These benefits, though, normally 
do not exceed the costs absorbed by foreign producers and domestic 
consumers.283 Protectionism thus creates both winners and losers, but 
overall reduces welfare.284 
An example illustrates the point. The Canadian province of 
Ontario put in place a feed-in tariff (“FIT”) scheme that paid 
electricity producers preferential rates for energy generated 
renewably so long as the renewable generation equipment was locally 
produced.285 An American corporation, Mesa Energy, challenged this 
so-called “local content requirement” as discriminating against 
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foreign investors in violation of NAFTA.286 In essence, Mesa claimed 
(as the United States, the EU, and Japan successfully did within the 
WTO)287 that it lost sales of its renewable energy equipment within 
Ontario because Ontario electricity producers were able to purchase 
locally produced equipment more cheaply as a result of the Ontario 
subsidy.288 Without the subsidy, the locally produced equipment might 
have been more expensive than Mesa’s turbines. Thus, Mesa Energy 
lost market share within Ontario, while Ontario citizens shouldered 
the fiscal burden of providing a subsidy to local renewable energy 
equipment producers. 
By immunizing local governments from the pressure to liberalize 
their discriminatory practices, agreements like the TPP thus reduce 
the overall welfare gains from economic agreements. Under the TPP, 
a program like Ontario’s FIT program could not be challenged by 
private parties. While American producers could proceed, as Mesa 
did, under NAFTA, TPP members such as Japan without another 
investment agreement with Canada would be out of luck. Such 
producers would continue to lose market share while Canadian 
consumers of renewable energy equipment would not obtain the most 
competitive product. 
This conclusion needs to be qualified in two respects. On the one 
hand, economic discrimination against foreign economic interests is 
more likely at the local level of government than the national level.289 
Insulating local government from discrimination claims thus may 
protect great swaths of economic discrimination, making immunity 
even worse than it might otherwise seem. On the other hand, local 
discrimination also can promote local efforts to provide global public 
goods, such as climate mitigation efforts.290 While economic law’s 
nondiscrimination rules cause local governments to internalize the 
costs of their actions in foreign jurisdictions, the same rules provide 
no means for those governments to capture any benefits their 
measures create.291 
One approach to solving this problem is a complete carve-out in 
economic agreements for particular areas where possibly 
discriminatory actions might increase the general welfare. The TPP 
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includes such a carve-out, for example, for tobacco control measures, 
which can be completely insulated from challenge.292 Professor Gus 
Van Harten has similarly argued that regional trade and investment 
agreements should include a carve-out for climate measures.293 Both 
of these approaches, as well as the approach of simply immunizing 
local conduct, are too broad. They protect too much discriminatory 
regulation, thereby eliminating many of the gains from economic 
treaties. 
Instead, changes should be made to the doctrines used to 
evaluate the legality of discrimination. In the context of local 
discrimination, this means that liability should exist for local acts, but 
such local acts should be evaluated in light of the specific features of 
local lawmaking.294 Put differently, local discrimination can have 
offsetting benefits and those benefits are worth protecting. But the 
best way to protect those benefits is not by an overly broad immunity 
for local governments. It is through a more targeted evaluation of 
which local programs promote the general welfare by creating 
positive spillovers and non-economic benefits and which, consistent 
with standard trade theory, simply create welfare losses for foreign 
suppliers and domestic consumers. 
B. Distributional Effects and the Legitimacy of International 
Economic Law 
Immunity for local measures also creates distributional effects 
that favor large countries with federal systems. Should the trend 
toward local immunity accelerate, these effects could call into 
question the legitimacy of international economic law. Sensitivity to 
these concerns is especially important at a time when trade and 
investment agreements such as the TPP, the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, and CETA are under attack.295 
The distributional effects of local immunity are clearest if one 
considers bargaining between large federal states like the United 
States and weaker centralized states. As discussed above, these 
situations are empirically more common and cover a greater 
percentage of world trade than the reverse—a negotiation between a 
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large centralized economy and a decentralized smaller economy.296 
For example, TPP negotiations, as well as many bilateral negotiations 
between Central and South American countries and the United 
States, fall into this category. As explained, these smaller economies 
will not agree to immunity unless they are given concessions at least 
equal to what they stand to lose from the move to immunity.297 In an 
absolute sense, these states are not made any worse off by immunity 
rules. 
In a relative sense, however, they are made worse off. States will 
only agree to immunity if the move makes them better off relative to 
their alternative. The concessions from federal states to non-federal 
states ensure that this condition is satisfied. In economic terms, it 
ensures that immunity is Pareto superior to the alternative. But it says 
nothing about how, or by whom, that alternative is defined. Because 
powerful states can link agreement on immunity to the broader 
market access concessions contained in the agreement, these powerful 
states will capture a greater share of the surplus from cooperation. 
For example, by delaying agreement, large federal economies like the 
EU or the United States could induce agreement on immunity 
without offering significantly greater concessions in terms of the 
substance of the agreement. They therefore get the benefit of their 
preferred rule—immunity—without having to significantly alter the 
terms of the agreement in their trading partners’ favor. 
As a result, the terms of economic treaties satisfy the relatively 
weak Pareto efficiency condition, but they skew the gains towards 
developed federal countries. These distributional effects cost not only 
those states that get less in terms of gains from cooperation; they also 
can cost large economies in the long run. These distributional effects 
create the perception that the deck is stacked against developing 
countries. Fearing that international economic law is simply a 
replacement for the colonial system that ended after World War II, 
these states may increasingly reject the international economic law 
system entirely. 
In the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, several South 
American countries did just that. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela all 
withdrew from the ICSID Convention, removing that institution’s 
jurisdiction over future investor-state claims.298 These countries also 
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began denouncing some of their BITs.299 Other Latin American 
countries, including Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico, among others, have 
declined to join the ICSID Convention in the first place.300 Argentina 
has threatened to withdraw from ICSID in the wake of a large 
number of successful investment claims against it following its 
financial collapse,301 but has not yet done so.302 
Although currently confined to Latin America, these trends 
illustrate the risks of an international economic system that is 
perceived to favor wealthy nations. Distributional considerations can 
strain the system’s existence, a threat that impacts the interests of 
both developed and developing states. For this reason, removing an 
unnecessary carve-out for local measures that favors developed 
federal states would, in the long run, help preserve the international 
economic system. 
C. Insulating the Future from International Governance 
The final difficulty with immunity is that it removes international 
accountability for local governments at the same time that local 
governments are increasingly exercising their authority in a way that 
produces international effects. The reasons for the importance of 
local governments are multifaceted. Economic interdependence has 
given many traditionally local powers an international dimension. 
Economic integration means that local laws can have significant 
effects on foreign investors or producers. The global nature of many 
businesses highlights this point. Multinational enterprises often own 
businesses and property in many different countries, meaning that 
they are potentially subject to the jurisdiction of many different 
national and local governments. Local regulation of these enterprises 
thus has a global dimension simply because of the nature of the 
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regulated entities. The size and regulatory authority of local 
governments in federal countries magnifies this effect.303 
Additionally, many nation-states have granted significant 
authority to regional governments in recent years. In October 2016, 
the Belgian region of Wallonia temporarily blocked the Belgian 
government’s (and therefore effectively the entire EU’s) ability to 
sign the CETA with Canada, relying on features of the Belgian 
federal structure that give regional parliaments a say in foreign 
affairs.304 In the United States, a robust constitutional federalism—
one that holds that the states should operate free from national 
interference across a wide range of issues—provides states with 
significant independent regulatory authority.305 More recently, it has 
given them the basis to act in areas, such as climate change or 
securities regulation, in which the federal government has declined to 
regulate aggressively.306 In other nations, a push for regional 
autonomy drives devolution. Following Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in 2008, for instance, autonomy movements have 
gained traction in Spain and elsewhere.307 
The United Kingdom has also been a particularly active site for 
exploring increased powers for localities. In the 1990s, Scotland and 
Wales received a significant boost in their autonomy, including 
individual parliamentary bodies with authority over a variety of 
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areas.308 Not satisfied, in September 2014, Scotland held a referendum 
on full independence.309 While the referendum failed, an 
unexpectedly close vote resulted in promises from the United 
Kingdom for even further autonomy.310 Calls for devolution within 
the United Kingdom have received renewed impetus following the 
June 2016 “Brexit” referendum. Within the United Kingdom, fifty-
two percent voted in favor of Britain leaving the European Union.311 
However, majorities in London, Scotland, and Northern Ireland 
voted in favor of staying within the European Union.312 In the fallout 
from Brexit, London—a global financial capital—has called for 
greater independence from the United Kingdom in order to preserve 
its global standing,313 while Scotland has revisited the possibility of 
secession.314 Although the outcome of these calls for devolution 
remains to be seen, they offer a window into how local governments 
might be allowed more direct interaction with international 
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institutions. Relationships between localities and international 
institutions could vindicate different local preferences about the 
globalization within a single country. 
Local government action on climate change provides a concrete 
example of the international sweep of local action. Cities around the 
world have come together to negotiate climate change agreements 
meant to fill in the gaps in the formal international regime.315 U.S. 
states have created transboundary carbon trading schemes as a 
vehicle to reduce carbon emissions.316 The U.S. Conference of Mayors 
produced the Climate Protection Agreement, under which hundreds 
of U.S. cities agreed to take measures to combat climate change, 
including striving to meet or beat Kyoto Protocol targets within their 
own communities.317 Local governments have also been incredibly 
active in creating different kinds of clean energy support programs. 
Local governments have, for example, created FITs that pay 
premiums for electricity produced from renewable sources.318 
Subnational governments have created renewable portfolio 
requirements, a regulatory measure that mandates that utility 
companies generate or purchase a certain amount of renewable 
power.319 They have also provided financial incentives for distributing 
renewable energy, encouraging homeowners, for example, to install 
solar panels on their roofs.320 
More recently, nations have begun to appropriate this local 
activity in service of fulfilling their international climate change 
commitments.321 On September 15, 2015, the top climate change 
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negotiators from the United States and China met in Los Angeles.322 
They did not meet to discuss their nations’ efforts to combat climate 
change, nor directly to discuss national efforts or commitments with 
respect to the climate change agreement they hoped to conclude in 
Paris in December 2015. Instead, they convened with the leaders of 
about a dozen American and Chinese cities, states, and provinces.323 
The purpose of the meeting was twofold. First, the meeting facilitated 
discussions among these regional and local leaders about subnational 
climate change mitigation efforts.324 Second, the summit concluded 
with a declaration signed by the officials in attendance stating their 
joint goal of reducing their governments’ impact on climate change, as 
well as identifying individual framework commitments for each 
participating locality.325 Beyond simply enshrining the commitments 
of local leaders, the declaration also established a policy framework 
through which the American and Chinese national governments 
could satisfy obligations undertaken in the forthcoming climate 
change agreement. In other words, the summit partially delegated 
compliance with national climate change obligations to local 
governments. 
The delegation of international obligations to local governments 
raises the possibility that significant action designed to address 
international problems could avoid international review. Recent 
research looking only at renewable energy shows that discriminatory 
renewable energy support programs exist in twenty-three out of fifty 
U.S. states.326 Indeed, while recent studies have identified twenty local 
content requirements in the renewable sector at the national level,327 
my research identifies forty-four such programs at the state level 
alone.328 More such programs exist at the truly local level.329 This 
evidence from just a single sector suggests that local discrimination is 
a significant problem that requires international attention. 
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Moreover, the prevalence of local discrimination highlights the 
risk of undermining the efficacy of international law, and especially 
international dispute settlement, going forward. If nations can 
simultaneously put their local governments beyond review and then 
ask them to carry out international obligations, the successes of the 
post-Cold War world in legalizing international relations face 
rollback. Governmental form can, after all, be manipulated. The 
shifting of power upward within the EU, and downward in countries 
like Spain and the UK, testifies to the fluid nature of power 
arrangements within countries. If international law insists that only 
the nation-states can be liable and then immunizes a broad swath of 
what the nation does, we can expect power to flow increasingly 
downward to escape review. The acceleration of this trend will, in 
turn, exacerbate the welfare and distributional implications of 
immunity and thereby add to the stress on the international economic 
system. 
V.  DIRECT LIABILITY 
Immunity threatens the international economic system, yet 
nations face strong incentives to substitute immunity for vicarious 
liability. Policymakers need a liability rule that is more stable than 
vicarious liability but avoids the cost of immunity. This Part argues 
that direct liability is such a rule. This Part first explains how direct 
liability would work and then argues that direct liability is a politically 
feasible alternative. 
A. How Direct Liability Would Work 
Direct liability should become the default rule under 
international economic law. This proposal has two components. First, 
the law of state responsibility should provide that local governments 
are directly responsible under international law for breaches of 
international economic obligations. Second, grants of jurisdiction to 
international tribunals to resolve trade and investment disputes 
should be understood to include jurisdiction over claims against 
subnational governments unless otherwise specified. Together, these 
two rules would ensure that local governments can be held directly 
accountable for violations of international law. At the same time, 
national governments should also remain responsible for violations by 
their subnational governments. 
The proposed rule is thus one of joint and several liability. Other 
versions of direct liability are, of course, possible. For example, one 
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might adopt a rule that mirrors the ICSID Convention, under which 
local governments are only amenable to jurisdiction and 
responsibility if they have been designated in advance by their 
national government and have themselves consented to the claim. 
Alternatively, one might imagine a rule that permits claims against 
local governments to be brought only against local governments, 
absolving national governments of liability. 
Joint and several liability has several virtues, however, that 
better balance the interests of claimants and respondent governments 
at both the national and local level. First, the availability and 
adequacy of relief against subnational governments is a major 
concern. Requiring national governments to remain liable for 
violations by their subnational governments, as is done under the 
ICSID Convention,330 ensures that a successful claimant has access to 
relief. Second, making local responsibility and jurisdiction the default 
rules, rather than requiring additional consent from both the national 
and local government, ensures that the local government has the 
proper incentives to consider the legality of its actions. If local 
governments could evade effective international responsibility by 
refusing to consent to jurisdiction, the incentives for local 
governments to be law-abiding would be severely undercut. 
Procedurally, a claimant would choose whether to bring its claim 
against the nation, the local government, or both. Presumably, a 
claimant will select the respondent from which it expects to most 
easily and effectively obtain relief. For example, in a trade dispute in 
which the challenging country has little economic leverage over the 
local government, the claimants may choose to bring a claim against 
the national government. Alternatively, a claimant might choose to 
bring a claim against only the local government, because, for instance, 
a local government may be more willing to settle. 
An award against one level of government would not 
automatically be enforceable against the other government if the 
other government had not been party to the dispute. The judgment 
would, however, be persuasive in a subsequent claim against the other 
government, if for some reason an award against the initial 
respondent did not result in an adequate remedy. For example, if a 
local government is unable to pay the damages from an investment 
arbitration award, the challenger could bring a claim against the 
national government to have its responsibility established. This 
proceeding should be fairly brief, requiring only a showing that the 
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local entity is in fact a government for which the national government 
is responsible. 
In the trade context, matters are a bit more complicated. Because 
trade concessions are made at the national level, and the remedy for a 
failure to comply is the withdrawal of concessions, all relief is 
necessarily at the national level. For this reason, we might expect that 
claimants will always bring claims against the national government 
under trade law. While that may be, claimants may have reasons for 
bringing claims first against the local government. Bringing a claim 
against a national government, after all, can have diplomatic and 
political costs. Those costs are reduced in the event of a challenge to a 
local government. A claimant may therefore test the legality of a local 
government’s action through, for example, a WTO dispute against 
only the local government. If the local government continues its 
unlawful conduct, then the claimant can establish the responsibility of 
the national government through a separate proceeding, if it wishes to 
take that step. At that point, the claimant can seek authorization to 
suspend concessions. As mentioned above, the successful challenger 
should first suspend concessions that target the local government. 
Only if those are insufficient should the suspended concession target 
the respondent nation generally. 
National governments would also have a right of intervention in 
claims against their subnational governments. Thus, if an investment 
claim challenged the actions of California, the United States could 
still intervene if the challenger did not choose to include the United 
States. This feature ensures that the national government can, if it 
wishes, continue to play a role in shaping international jurisprudence. 
The decisions of international tribunals bear on the nation’s own 
obligations, as well as the liability of its other local governments. The 
right of intervention thus ensures that the national government can 
protect its long-term interests in the interpretation of international 
obligations, while leaving local governments to defend the run-of-the-
mill suits where liability (or the lack thereof) is more straightforward. 
Likewise, as a matter of domestic law, national governments 
would be free to reallocate any loss as they see fit. Nations could 
impose losses absorbed by the national government on the local 
governments, or could agree to absorb losses felt by local 
governments. National governments can already do this, although 
they rarely seem to do so. Joint and several liability might give 
national governments a further incentive to think seriously about the 
relationship between the local and national governments in 
international affairs. 
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The right of intervention also provides national governments 
with the ability to act as counsel for their local governments. Local 
governments may lack the legal or financial capacity to defend against 
international claims. Many national governments may also lack this 
capacity, but national governments are likely in a better position to 
defend international claims than are local governments. A rule of 
joint and several liability with a right of intervention ensures that the 
national government can remain as involved in claims against its local 
governments as it chooses to be. 
Significantly, the form of direct liability proposed here would not 
expose local governments to a raft of claims. Local governments 
would continue to be protected by the relatively small value of 
challenging most local programs. Even under current law, many local 
acts, especially in the trade context, are not of sufficient magnitude to 
warrant initiating a dispute. Nothing about a move to direct liability 
would change this fact. While more claims might be brought in 
anticipation of a greater chance at obtaining relief, local governments 
would remain protected by the cost-benefit calculation claimants 
make. International disputes are expensive and, in the trade context, 
involve political and diplomatic decisions. Claimants would continue 
to use the ability to bring these claims sparingly, given their costs and 
potential rewards. Moreover, in the investment context, in which the 
fear of disputes as an intimidation tactic is most real, the ability of the 
national government to intervene should serve as at least a minimal 
deterrent to frivolous litigation. 
B. Direct Liability Increases Welfare and Is Politically Feasible 
The proposal outlined above would satisfy two conditions any 
proposed liability rule should meet: (1) it increases general welfare, 
and (2) it is politically feasible. From a general welfare perspective, 
direct liability would create welfare gains that exceed those under 
either vicarious liability or immunity. Direct liability creates greater 
pressure on local governments to conform to their international 
obligations by removing existing discriminatory practices. As 
discussed in Part IV, removing these discriminatory practices will 
increase the general welfare by allowing domestic consumers to 
purchase goods, services and capital at the most competitive rates, 
while also allowing foreign suppliers with comparative advantage 
greater access to markets overseas. Going forward, direct liability also 
establishes a precedent that local governments must comply with their 
international obligations. Although the international law of state 
responsibility has long required this, by placing responsibility solely 
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on the national government the law of state responsibility has failed 
to establish incentives for local compliance. Direct liability thus 
improves the incentives for compliance, while at the same time giving 
claimants better access to relief. Direct liability also alleviates the 
distributional issues created by immunity. Centralized states can once 
again bring claims and force liberalization of large local governments. 
In addition, direct liability must be politically feasible. After all, 
vicarious liability is a more efficient than immunity,331 although states 
have gravitated towards immunity because it offers them certain 
advantages that come at the expense of the overall welfare created by 
economic treaties. As explained below, direct liability is indeed 
politically feasible. Equally important, it is more stable than strict 
immunity as a default rule. It is therefore more likely to remain in 
place. 
The push for immunity comes from federal nations that face high 
costs when avoiding liability for local acts. States take precaution to 
avoid liability—they liberalize—up until the point at which the 
marginal costs of liberalization equal the marginal benefits in terms of 
liability avoided. States with high political costs to liberalization at the 
local level will prefer liability to liberalization once an agreement is in 
place. As argued in Part III, this calculus pushes federal states to 
negotiate for immunity rules ex ante. The reduced liability does come 
at the cost of reduced gains from trade liberalization. Those gains, 
however, would not be perfectly captured by the negotiating 
government. The government is therefore willing to forego some 
gains from trade in order to reduce its liability. 
Direct liability offers national governments a superior resolution 
to this problem. Direct liability allows national governments to shift 
responsibility for local action onto local governments in the first 
instance. From the national governments’ point of view, direct 
liability thus achieves the same liability reduction goal as immunity. 
To be sure, direct liability of the kind this Article has proposed above 
does not completely eliminate national responsibility for local acts, as 
immunity does. Nations can remain on the hook if local governments 
cannot provide the mandated relief. And claimants can proceed 
directly against the national government and will continue to do so 
when effective relief is not available from the local government. 
Nevertheless, one would still expect a significant reduction in national 
liability for local acts as measured against vicarious liability. 
Claimants might well prefer to bring claims against smaller, less 
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staffed local governments than against national governments. As 
discussed above, obtaining relief (especially in trade disputes) might 
in some instances be easier and more effective against a local 
government. And while a national government may intervene, it does 
not have to if it prefers to let a challenged local government stand on 
its own two feet. 
Moreover, direct liability does not come with the same set of 
costs as either vicarious liability or immunity. Direct liability 
continues to give states an incentive to liberalize and successful 
claimants a viable remedy. Indeed, the incentive to liberalize will be 
increased because local jurisdictions will internalize the costs of their 
actions to a greater extent.332 
Put in terms of the model in Part III, direct liability reduces (but 
does not eliminate) Y, a national government’s expected liability for 
local acts. At the same time, it maintains or even increases the size of 
X, the state’s expected utility as a claimant. All claims remain viable 
(ensuring relief), and the liberalizing effect of those claims will be 
greater than under either immunity or vicarious liability. Moreover, 
C—the concessions necessary to contract around the default rule—is 
eliminated by making direct liability the default rule. Because direct 
liability delivers greater utility to national governments, they have 
little incentive to contract around it. For this reason, direct liability 
will be more stable as a default rule than vicarious liability. 
The major political objection to direct liability would probably 
come from local governments themselves. Under current law, local 
governments can free ride on their national governments. Direct 
liability would remove this ability. Local governments would now be 
responsible for the consequences of their actions. In the negotiation 
of economic agreements, local governments might therefore be 
expected to oppose direct liability and push instead for immunity. 
Indeed, U.S. governors have objected to certain provisions of the 
TPP, such as protections for pharmaceutical companies that 
effectively increase drug prices.333 
Although liberalizing trade is politically unpopular at the 
moment, local governments have often supported trade deals in the 
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past. U.S. state governors, for example, overwhelmingly supported 
NAFTA.334 Local governments are therefore unlikely to be a long-
term obstacle.335 Indeed, they stand to gain from a move to direct 
liability. The regime would give local governments—especially large 
state or provincial governments likely to be involved in international 
disputes, such as California—a greater say in the obligations imposed 
upon them. This influence comes in two forms. First, knowing that 
they are going to be subject to international obligations more directly 
than they currently are, local governments will assert themselves at 
the negotiations stage in an effort to influence the substantive terms 
in economic agreements. This influence can be used to obtain 
concessions that are especially important to them. For example, 
California and Minnesota, states that have significant subsidies for 
renewable energy that are vulnerable under economic law’s 
nondiscrimination rules,336 might push for specific rules to protect 
environmental subsidies. Alternatively, they might push for 
concessions on market access for particular goods produced in-state. 
Second, because local governments would be able to participate 
in dispute resolution directly, they would be able to influence the 
interpretation of international obligations. To be sure, national 
governments would continue to play the predominant role here. 
Trade agreements typically create “commissions” consisting of the 
member states that are authorized to issue binding interpretative 
notes, a practice that NAFTA parties have followed to clarify the 
obligations contained in the investment chapter of that agreement.337 
National governments could also use their right of intervention to 
control litigation on legal issues of strategic importance to them. 
Local governments would, however, be able to bring their perspective 
to international disputes—a perspective that is at present almost 
totally absent. Indeed, international economic law would be greatly 
improved through consideration of the unique challenges local 
governments face in meeting their economic, environmental, and 
social goals consistent with international obligations. 
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Finally, direct liability is consistent with the demand many 
subnational governments make for greater power relative to their 
own national governments. Within the United States, state 
governments would have a difficult time simultaneously arguing for 
plenary state police powers (as they are understood to have under the 
U.S. Constitution) and yet objecting to bearing the responsibilities 
that come with such a power. 
In this sense, direct liability elevates the status of local 
governments and recognizes the critical role they play in federal 
systems. Other federal governments with strong subnational units 
might also find an unexpectedly warm reception from their local 
governments. The EU is, once again, the clearest example. While EU 
member states may be content to rest the responsibility for defending 
certain claims on the EU, they might embrace the notion of a 
continuing role in investment and trade policy. 
In sum, in federal states in which there is a robust push and pull 
between the center and the periphery, the periphery might well 
welcome greater responsibilities as a sign of both of its status and as a 
bargaining chip with the center. In federal states with weak 
peripheries, the national government may simply impose direct 
liability as a way to control its localities and avoid liability. In either 
case, direct liability as a default rule would both facilitate local 
participation in international economic law, while at the same time 
furthering the goals of liberalization and accountability that underlie 
the international economic system. 
CONCLUSION 
The world is full of a bewildering array of governmental 
arrangements. Federations like the United States or Germany, 
confederations like Switzerland, supranational institutions like the 
EU, and unitary states like the United Kingdom all allocate their 
powers differently. For many years, international law’s approach to 
these domestic distinctions was to ignore them. That rule, 
consolidated in the nineteenth century, might well have made sense 
when the nation-state had only recently emerged as the dominant 
form of political organization and international trade had not yet 
captured a significant portion of economic activity. 
Today that is no longer the case. Local and regional governments 
regularly play a role in international affairs. U.S. states negotiate 
agreements with Canadian provinces and foreign governments; the 
policies of Mexican states or Canadian provinces affect the value of 
American investments. Political power also regularly flows both 
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upward—from member states to the EU—and downward—from the 
United Kingdom to Scotland and Wales. Moreover, international 
trade and foreign investment account for more than half of many 
nations’ GDPs.338 
International dispute resolution and the law of state 
responsibility need to evolve to take these changing circumstances 
into account. Unfortunately, the only change has been one that 
formally preserves the centrality of the nation-state while practically 
damaging international economic law’s ability to drive economic 
growth and development. The time has come to reorient 
government’s relationship to international law. Trade and investment 
agreements like the TPP offer the ideal place to start. 
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